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WHEN IS A USE IN COMMERCE A
NONCOMMERCIAL USE?
LEE ANN W. LOCKRIDGE*
ABSTRACT

When is a use in commerce a noncommercial use? This question
may sound like the opening for a ridiculous legal riddle, but it is a
real conundrum in trademark dilution law. The current federal dilution statute, section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, creates liability based on
the “use of a mark or trade name in commerce,” when that use is likely
to blur or tarnish a famous mark. At the same time, the statute characterizes certain activities as nonactionable “exclusions,” including
“any noncommercial use of a mark.” So the use of a mark in commerce
can be a noncommercial use—but how—and why? This Article comprehensively examines the statutory exclusion for “noncommercial use
of a mark” within the federal dilution statute. This includes the legislative history of the federal dilution statute, trademark and First
Amendment jurisprudence, and court decisions to date interpreting
the statute. Based on this research, the Article explains how courts
and potential litigants should interpret the exclusion to achieve its
purpose as a predictable, efficient defense that excuses a broad range
of expressive uses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The current federal dilution cause of action, enacted in 2006 to replace the 1995 statute, provides as follows:
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. I thank
Professors Mark Janis and Lisa Ramsey for their valuable comments on this Article.
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Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous
mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against
another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has
become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in
commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the
presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.1

As set forth in Parts II.B.-D. of this Article, Congress recognized
the possibility of a serious First Amendment problem with the expansive scope of dilution liability. Congress addressed this concern by exempting certain uses through statutory exclusions. This Article deals
with one of those exclusions: “[a]ny noncommercial use of a mark.”2
The appropriate interpretation of “noncommercial use of a mark”
does not immediately leap from the statutory text or even the broader context of trademark dilution. Depending on whether the meaning
of “use in commerce” is more than merely jurisdictional, the confusion might even rise to the level of a textual conflict. As a result, general principles of interpretation point to the legislative history of the
exclusion.3 That history indicates that the correct interpretation
of “noncommercial use of a mark” is use of a mark in speech that is
not pure “commercial speech” as understood in First Amendment jurisprudence.4 The exclusion, then, restricts actionable dilution to
commercial speech.
Unfortunately, numerous court decisions have failed to fully appreciate the role of the exclusion. Many, if not most, courts exploring
the issue of commercial versus noncommercial use before 2006 focused on the Federal Trademark Dilution Act’s (FTDA’s) “commercial
use in commerce” language in the primary liability provision rather
than the “noncommercial use” language in the exclusion.5 And al1. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). Dilution by blurring is defined as “association
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs
the distinctiveness of the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). Dilution by tarnishment
is defined as “association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a
famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
When the user of the diluting mark “willfully intended to trade on the recognition of the
famous mark” or “willfully intended to harm the reputation of the famous mark,” monetary
remedies are also available. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5)(B).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C).
3. Even Justice Scalia, who regularly expresses disdain for the use of legislative
history, has accepted reference to legislative history in order to obtain the meaning of an
otherwise conflicting or nonsensical statute. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490
U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 22-23, 31 (1997).
4. See infra Parts II.C.-D.
5. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)). For example, in Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v.
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though the Trademark Dilution Reform Act (TDRA) of 2006 eliminated the “commercial use” language, courts may continue to focus on
the “use . . . in commerce” language,6 extending the trend of disregarding the noncommercial use exclusion. In some instances this is
appropriate, but in others it unnecessarily complicates resolution of
the case, which might easily be reached under the noncommercial use
exclusion. Other courts applying the FTDA and TDRA have reached
the exclusion but have applied it incorrectly by failing to utilize First
Amendment commercial speech jurisprudence when applying the exclusion.7 And other courts, even those purporting to apply the statuKremer, Kremer was displeased with hair-restoration services received from Bosley
Medical Institute and started a website at www.bosleymedical.com in which he strongly
criticized the company. 403 F.3d 672, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2005). Bosley Medical sued Kremer
for trademark infringement, dilution, and cybersquatting under the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), among other claims. Id. at 675, 680.
Although the Ninth Circuit determined that the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Kremer on the ACPA claim was improper, it affirmed summary judgment for
Kremer on the infringement and dilution claims by finding that Kremer’s site was
noncommercial. Id. at 676-80. The court did not base its ruling specifically on the
noncommercial use exclusion; instead, it based the ruling on a construction of both
infringement and dilution under the Lanham Act that required “commercial use.” Id. at
676-77. The court found that only a use “in connection with a sale of goods or services”
would constitute commercial use. Id. at 677. Although the Ninth Circuit panel in Kremer
referenced the First Amendment and the court’s own decision in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA
Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), in explaining why a distinction could be drawn
between commercial and noncommercial uses, the court did not use First Amendment
commercial speech doctrine to explain its requirement of a “commercial use.” Kremer, 403
F.3d at 677. Instead, it used the language of sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Id.
As a result, the court applied its interpretation of the standard for a prima facie case,
rather than the standard for proving the noncommercial use exclusion. See also TMI, Inc.
v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2004) (briefly examining the “commercial use in
commerce” language and noting that the noncommercial use exclusion “further indicates
that the provision only applies to commercial use,” but not appearing to acknowledge the
speech-protective implications of the exclusion).
6. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730
(2006) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)).
7. For example, in a series of domain-name related cases, courts created a
“commercial effects” rationale that was applied to both “commercial use in commerce” and
“noncommercial use.” In Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, one of the later domain name cases
following the “commercial effects” rationale, the noncommercial use exclusion was directly
addressed by the court. 993 F. Supp. 282, 307 (D.N.J. 1998). The court acknowledged that
the exclusion was intended to exclude protected speech from the reach of dilution liability.
Id. Interestingly, although the court addressed the issue under the heading “The Use by
Defendant of the Mark and the Name of the Plaintiff Organization Constitutes Commercial
Speech,” it did not refer to any First Amendment commercial speech cases when making its
determination. Id. The court concluded that the site’s use was commercial because (1) it
was a “bogus” site intended to intercept persons interested in the Jews for Jesus
organization; (2) it linked to the Outreach Judaism Organization website, which raised
money through sales of merchandise; and (3) the use was “designed to harm the Plaintiff
Organization commercially by disparaging it and preventing the Plaintiff Organization
from exploiting the Mark . . . . In addition, [it would] continue to inhibit the efforts of
Internet users to locate the Plaintiff Organization Internet site.” Id. at 308. For this
“effects” analysis of noncommercial use, the court referred to Panavision Int’l, L.P., v.
Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996), and Planned Parenthood Fed’n of America
Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), two earlier domain name dilution
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tory exclusion, have raced past the exclusion to create a ruling directly based on the First Amendment.8 Fortunately, a few courts have
applied the First Amendment “definition” of commercial speech to interpret and apply the noncommercial use exclusion, as the legislative
history indicates they should.9 In so doing, these courts ensured that
dilution liability reaches only purely commercial speech, as Congress
apparently intended.
This Article comprehensively analyzes the noncommercial use exclusion, including its legislative and jurisprudential history. Applying
a nuanced reading of First Amendment cases to the meaning of the
noncommercial use exclusion means that uses blending commercial
and noncommercial speech elements fall within the exclusion, not
within the scope of dilution liability. A bare reading of the statute,
even if combined with a nominal First Amendment analysis, could
leave mixed speech in an indeterminate status within dilution. Indeterminacy can chill expressive uses. This Article recommends interpreting the noncommercial use exclusion as a broad affirmative defense that predictably and efficiently narrows the reach of federal dilution liability to purely commercial speech.
II. HISTORY OF THE NONCOMMERCIAL USE EXCLUSION
A. Dilution Before 1988
Significant experience with trademark dilution laws in the United
States is relatively short, despite the fact that the first extended argument in favor of the cause of action was made over eighty years
ago in an American law review article by Frank Schechter.10 He arcases. It referred to these cases with respect to “noncommercial use” even though
Panavision only superficially considered speech interests because the facts did not warrant
additional inquiry, and Planned Parenthood addressed its “effects” analysis to the prima
facie case, not to the exclusion. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. at 308; see Panavision, 945 F. Supp.
at 1303; Planned Parenthood, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1437.
8. See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1018 (9th
Cir. 2004) (acknowledging the speech-protective function of the exclusion but concluding
that the district court’s injunction under the FTDA violated the First Amendment, rather
than basing its decision on the statutory exclusion).
9. See, e.g., Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905 (“[T]he legislative history of the FTDA suggests
an interpretation of the ‘noncommercial use’ exemption that both solves our interpretive
dilemma and diminishes some First Amendment concerns: ‘Noncommercial use’ refers to a
use that consists entirely of noncommercial, or fully constitutionally protected, speech.”);
American Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 695-96 (N.D. Ohio 2002)
(“[W]hen Congress passed the [FDTA], it used the phrase ‘noncommercial use’ as a
somewhat inexact, short hand reference to ‘speech protected by the First Amendment.’ ”);
Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1573-74 (S.D. Cal. 1996)
(holding that the noncommercial use exclusion exempts from FTDA claims the expressive
use of trademarks because such uses are protected by the First Amendment).
10. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813 (1927); see also DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-9 (2002). Even so, Schechter was not the first person to conclude
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gued for a recalibration of the focus of trademark infringement law
away from confusion, which begets the relative question of whether a
second use of a mark is sufficiently competitive to create actionable
confusion.11 He advocated the application of what he thought was the
more realistic basis for existing decisions, namely the more absolute
notion of a mark’s uniqueness, and thus its selling power.12 He based
this argument both on his analysis of recent cases, in which courts
had begun to provide protection to trademarks when related (and not
just competitive) goods bore an infringing mark, and on his observation that “coined” marks (often referred to as fanciful marks in current trademark parlance) received greater protection in infringement
actions than “commonplace” ones.13 Where there is no uniqueness to
preserve, Schechter’s argument does not support broad protection of
a mark such that a mark owner could enjoin its use on noncompetitive goods—even a “commercial use” or “trademark use” of the mark
on those goods.14
Two decades after Schechter wrote, state laws began to incorporate the dilution rationale. The cause of action defined by state legislatures, however, bore little relationship to Schechter’s analysis and
prescription for protecting uniqueness. Schechter advocated broad
protection of unique, inherently distinctive marks and narrow protection of noninherently distinctive marks because, he argued, actual
uniqueness was the real power and value of a mark that needed
strong legal protection. This reasoning, however, did not take hold in
state law. State laws reflected only the concept of restricting uses of
marks that made any senior mark less distinctive.15
Massachusetts adopted the first dilution statute in 1947, with Illinois, New York, and Georgia following within the next decade.16
These early statutes provided for injunctive relief, even in the abthat trademark rights should extend beyond truly confusing uses. Welkowitz’s treatise
presents two cases that Welkowitz argues use dilution-like rationales under the guise
of confusion-based decisions. Id. n.15 (citing Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. John
Griffith’s Cycle Corp., 15 R.P.C. 105, 106 (1898) (holding infringing the use of the
mark KODAK for bicycles); Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928)
(ruling for the owner of YALE for locks when it opposed registration of YALE for batteries
and flashlights)).
11. Schechter, supra note 10, at 821.
12. Id. at 824-30.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 830-33.
15. While this mutation may seem odd, perhaps it is not as unusual as one might
hope; it is an example of the long-standing problem of a rule being divorced from its
rationale, and being unfortunately mutated in the process. See, e.g., Peaceable Planet, Inc.
v. Ty, Inc., 362 F.3d 986, 989-90 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The scope of a rule is often and here
limited by its rationale. Or, to make the same point differently, one way of going astray in
legal analysis is to focus on the semantics of a rule rather than its purpose.”).
16. Robert G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky
Road, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469, 497 (2008).
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sence of competition or confusion, when the plaintiff showed a “likelihood of . . . dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark,” or a likelihood of injury to business reputation.17 Unlike Frank Schechter’s vision for dilution, the statutes did not replace confusion-based infringement, nor were they limited to coined terms.18 These statutes
provided broad protections and contained no limiting language about
the means by which this dilution or reputational injury must be accomplished (such as a limitation to use of the plaintiff’s mark as defendant’s own mark), and they provided no statutory defenses.19
Variation in state laws increased over time, following two different Model State Trademark Bills promulgated by the International
Trademark Association (formerly the U.S. Trademark Association) in
1964 and 1992.20 Still, the laws required only that the diluted mark
be either distinctive (earlier laws) or famous (later laws), rather than
fanciful or coined.21 The state laws also did not specify the types
of uses of protected marks that would lead to liability (implying
that all uses of a protected mark or a similar mark could create liability) or provide statutory limitations on the actions (such as clear affirmative defenses).22
B. 1988: Failed Attempt at Federal Dilution Statute
Federal dilution law arose from a number of concerns. One fairly
simple and understandable concern was the inconsistency in state
laws. A trademark owner’s rights or, conversely, a new user’s rights
to use a mark on noncompetitive goods, varied from state to state. Dilution protection existed in some but not all states, and protection
differed even among states with a dilution action.23 This variance in17. Id.; David S. Welkowitz, State of the State: Is There a Future for State Dilution
Laws, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 681, 683 (2008).
18. Bone, supra note 16, at 499 n.148; Welkowitz, supra note 17, at 683.
19. Courts, however, read limitations into the statutes. Welkowitz, supra note 17, at
683-84 (noting that courts “often inserted a requirement of confusion into statutes that expressly disclaimed the need for it”).
20. Id. at 682-85; WELKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 11-21. A 1996 revision amended
dilution provisions to reflect the 1995 FTDA. The antidilution provisions of the 1964 and
1992 Model State Trademark Bills are reproduced in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS. See J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 22:8, 24:78-79
(4th ed. 2009). The most recent version of the Model State Trademark Bill, promulgated
in 2007, seeks to harmonize state dilution laws with the federal dilution statute as
amended in 2006. See http://www.inta.org (follow “Policy Development & Advocacy”
link; then “Model Guidelines” link; then “Model State Trademark Bill” link) (last visited
Mar. 26, 2010).
21. WELKOWITZ, supra note 10 at 14-16.
22. See id. at 11-21.
23. See Welkowitz, supra note 17, at 682-87, and sources cited therein. Welkowitz’s
succinct observation is that after several states enacted the second Model State Trademark
Bill (while other states retained their statutes under the first model), “there was now some
differentiation among the state laws. Where once there were only laws giving injunctive re-
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terfered with the Lanham Act’s stated goal of providing registered
trademarks with uniform rights across the United States. From a
trademark owner’s point of view, a strong justification for enacting a
federal dilution statute was that the patchwork of state rights to prevent dilution meant, in many cases, pursuing litigation in more than
one state in order to gain injunctive relief effective in more than one
state.24 Of course, for those who thought confusion-based trademark
rights should be limited to competing goods and services, the patchwork of rights was perhaps better than a uniform, strong right of
trademark owners to bring dilution claims.
The first federal bill including a cause of action against trademark
dilution came in 1987. At that time, Congress was considering a
large-scale revision to the Lanham Act which would include the
availability of intent-to-use applications in addition to use-based
trademark applications and shorten the term of registration of a
trademark from twenty years to ten years in order to reduce the
number of inactive or abandoned marks on the register.25 The bill introduced in the Senate in November 1987, Senate Bill 1883, included
a cause of action to enjoin dilution.26 It would have added a new subsection to section 43 of the Lanham Act in which the right of action
entitled an owner of a famous registered mark “subject to the principles of equity, to an injunction against another person’s use in
commerce of a mark, commencing after the registrant’s mark becomes famous, which causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
registrant’s mark” and gave seven nonexclusive factors that could be
used to analyze the distinctiveness and fame of the mark.27 The bill
defined dilution quite broadly: “the lessening of the distinctive quality of a famous mark through use of the mark by another person, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the
users of the mark, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception
arising from that use.”28 It did not provide any statutory exclusions
from liability.29
lief for ‘likelihood of dilution,’ of (apparently) any distinctive mark, now there were a group
of dilution laws protecting only ‘famous’ marks, with a definition, of sorts, of dilution, and
allowing damages in certain cases.” Id. at 684-85.
24. See David S. Welkowitz, Preemption, Extraterritoriality, and the Problem of State
Antidilution Laws, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1, 81-84 (1992) (discussing the reasons a state’s
antidilution laws should not be applied to conduct outside the state).
25. See 133 CONG. REC. 32812-13 (statement of Sen. DeConcini upon introducing
the bill).
26. Id. at 32813.
27. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1987, S. 1883, 100th Cong. § 29 (as introduced on
Nov. 19, 1987); 133 CONG. REC. 32816.
28. S. 1883 § 31; 133 CONG. REC. 32817.
29. The bill did provide for a defense to liability under state dilution laws:
Ownership of a valid registration under the Act of 1881 or the Act of 1905 or on
the principal register established herein shall be a complete bar to an action
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When the full Senate considered Senate Bill 1883 in May 1988,
the scope of dilution liability had been narrowed somewhat through
amendments reported by the Committee on the Judiciary.30 The action for dilution remained “subject to the principles of equity,” and
those principles of equity were to be applied “taking into account,
among other things, the good faith use of an individual’s name or an
indication of geographic origin.”31 The definition of dilution was only
slightly narrowed, moving from the original “lessening of the distinctive quality of a famous mark” to “material reduction of the distinctive quality of a famous mark.”32 The overall effect of the changes,
though, was to include minimal recognition that some arguably diluting uses of famous marks might need to be allowed based on certain
policy interests—though the only interests specifically acknowledged
were an individual’s interest in using his or her own name and the
accurate application of a term used to indicate the geographic origin
of goods or services. The Senate passed the amended version of the
bill.33 Later, in September 1988, the Committee on the Judiciary issued its report on the bill.34 The section-by-section analysis included
in the report contained some interesting commentary:
Dilution occurs when a person adopts the mark of another for
use as a trademark on noncompeting goods or services. Because
the later user must be using the mark as a trademark on noncompeting goods or services, traditional trademark infringement questions such as likelihood of confusion and competition between the
parties are not at issue. For these same reasons, concerns that a
federal dilution provision will reach to the use of another’s trademark in comparative advertising, satire, consumer reporting, and
editorial comment are unfounded; by its nature, dilution does not
and cannot reach to these “fair uses” of another’s trademark.35

According to the report, then, the “special protection” given to individuals’ names and accurate use of geographic terms would apply
even to use “as a trademark” and exclude those uses from liability.36
And anything other than use “as a trademark” would not give rise to
dilution liability at all.37 Thus, the Committee’s report narrowed the
brought by another person, under the common law or statute of a State,
seeking to prevent dilution of the distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form
of advertisement.
S. 1883 § 29(c)(3); 133 CONG. REC. 32816.
30. 134 CONG. REC. 11069-75 (1988).
31. Id. at 11072.
32. Id. at 11073.
33. Id. at 11075.
34. S. REP. NO. 100-515 (1988).
35. Id. at 41.
36. Id. at 41-43.
37. See id.
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potentially vast breadth of the language of Senate Bill 1883’s dilution
provision. The version of Senate Bill 1883 that ultimately passed
both houses of Congress and became law in November 1988 did not,
however, include any protection from dilution, either broad or narrow.38 Remarks made on the floor of the Senate after the House
amendment was brought back to the Senate indicated significant
disappointment with the House’s deletion of dilution from the bill:
Although this was a somewhat controversial issue, the Senate had
worked hard to come up with a carefully crafted compromise that
we thought would be acceptable to all. By eliminating this section,
the Federal Government loses the opportunity to provide guidance
to those States that have dilution laws, and to create greater certainty in this area.
...
Dilution is an important, developing area of the law. Eliminating this provision from the legislation will not eliminate the
accompanying problems; they merely will have to be addressed in
the future.39

Federal legislative activity on dilution lay dormant until 1995,
when a new trademark dilution bill was introduced in the House.40
That bill, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA), enjoyed a fairly rapid and uncomplicated trip through Congress, unlike
the 1988 attempt at legislation.41
C. 1995: Federal Trademark Dilution Act
As introduced, House Bill 1295 entitled the owner of a famous registered trademark, subject to principles of equity, to “an injunction
against another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or
trade name if such use begins after the registrant’s mark becomes
famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the registrant’s mark.”42 The liability provision had changed little since the
Senate’s 1988 version, but there were differences. First, the activity
leading to liability became “commercial use in commerce of a mark”
instead of mere “use in commerce of a mark.” Second, the specific
38. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
39. 134 CONG. REC. 32053 (1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). Interestingly, a bill
introduced in the House in March 1988 did include a dilution provision. H.R. 4156, 100th
Cong. §29 (as introduced on Mar. 15, 1988). But by September, following markup in
subcommittee (with the clean bill denominated House Bill 5372), the House trademark
revision bill did not contain any mention of dilution. The House later amended the Senate
Bill, S. 1883, which was the bill that passed both houses. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 100-1028
at 3-7 (1988).
40. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, H.R. 1295, 104th Cong. (1995).
41. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat 985 (1996).
42. H.R. 1295 § 3(a)(c)(1) (as introduced on Mar. 22, 1995).
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“principles of equity” that appeared in the last Senate dilution provision, a defendant’s use of his or her own name and the use of a geographic term to indicate origin, disappeared. Third, concerns about
speech interests and legitimate comparative advertising led to the
addition of two statutory exclusions from liability. Excluded from dilution liability were two types of uses of another’s trademark: “Fair
use of a registrant’s mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the registrant’s competing
goods or services,” and “Noncommercial use of a mark.”43
Interestingly, the concerns about overbreadth and the need for exclusions from liability did not lead to an express statement that dilution liability would only extend to a defendant’s use of a famous mark
“as a trademark on noncompeting goods or services,” as had been explained in the 1988 Senate Report.44 What constitutes use “as a
trademark” as opposed to other types of use of a mark is difficult to
define clearly and concisely.45 But that the House chose not to expressly limit dilution liability to use “as a trademark,” and instead
provided two exclusions from liability, raises the question of whether
the House in fact intended for its dilution provision to sweep more
broadly than the 1988 Senate proposal, or at least was entirely indifferent to its breadth.
Eight months after the bill’s introduction and referral to the
House Committee on the Judiciary, House Bill 1295 was reported as
amended, accompanied by a House Report.46 The amendments made
the dilution cause of action applicable to both registered and unregistered trademarks and added a third category of uses that would not
be actionable, namely, “[a]ll forms of news reporting and news commentary.”47 According to the House Report, the federal dilution cause
of action aimed to protect famous marks from unauthorized uses that
“reduce[] the public’s perception that the mark signifies something
unique, singular, or particular.”48 The report acknowledged that dilution “recognizes the substantial investment the owner has made in
the mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark itself, protecting both from those who would appropriate the mark for their

43. Id. § 3(a)(c)(4)(A)-(B).
44. See S. REP. NO. 100-515, 41 (1988).
45. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons from the Trademark Use
Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1703, 1713-14 (2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie & Janis, Lessons];
Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773,
775-76, 791-800 (2009); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over
Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1641-57 (2007) [hereinafter
Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion Over Use].
46. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995).
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id. at 3.
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own gain.”49 This language indicates that at least one member of the
House intended a dilution claim to protect the mark owner’s proprietary interests rather than to protect consumer interests or to prevent
unfair competition. The exclusions from the scope of the claim—the
fair use, news reporting, and noncommercial use exceptions—were
explained only as follows:
The proposal adequately addresses legitimate First Amendment concerns espoused by the broadcasting industry and the media. The bill will not prohibit or threaten “noncommercial” expression, as that term has been defined by the courts. Nothing in this
bill is intended to alter existing case law on the subject of what
constitutes “commercial” speech. The bill includes specific language exempting from liability the “fair use” of a mark in the context of comparative commercial advertising or promotion as well as
all forms of news reporting and news commentary. The latter provision which was added to H.R. 1295 as a result of an amendment
offered by Congressman Moorhead that was adopted by the Committee, recognizes the heightened First Amendment protection afforded the news industry.50

In the section-by-section analysis in the report, the “use in commerce” language from the liability provision (“commercial use in
commerce of a mark”) was explained by reference to the need for an
interstate commerce nexus.51 The “commercial use” language, however, was not addressed at all.52 The section-by-section analysis also
stated that the exceptions were
designed to preclude the courts from enjoining speech that courts
have recognized to be constitutionally protected. . . . [s]ection (4)(B)
of the bill expressly incorporates the concept of “commercial”
speech from the “commercial speech” doctrine, and proscribes dilution actions that seek to enjoin use of famous marks in “noncommercial” uses (such as consumer product reviews).53

49. Id.
50. Id. at 4. Although the author of these statements in the House Report may have
believed that the bill “adequately addresse[d] legitimate First Amendment concerns,”
scholars and others do not necessarily agree that federal dilution law, then or now,
sufficiently protects expressive uses of marks. See, e.g., Mary LaFrance, No Reason to Live:
Dilution Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 58 S. C. L. REV. 709
(2007); Paul Alan Levy, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act—A Consumer Perspective, 16
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1189 (2006); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty
Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008); see also
Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095
(2003) (arguing that any restriction on use of a descriptive trademark is unconstitutional,
including protection via infringement and dilution law).
51. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 at 7.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 8.
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The report provided no further explanation or elaboration on the
exceptions. The report contains no explicit discussion of why, given
the applicability of the cause of action only to “another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name,” a “noncommercial
use” exception was deemed necessary.
On December 12, 1995, the bill as amended passed the House.54
Other than the remark by Representative Moorhead that “[t]he bill
would not prohibit or threaten noncommercial expression, such as
parody, satire, editorial, and other forms of expression that are not a
part of a commercial transaction,” the House engaged in no further
discussion of the First Amendment implications of the “noncommercial use” exception or any other aspect of the bill.55 On December 29,
1995, the Senate passed the amended bill without further modification, with the only speech-related remark being Senator Leahy’s
statement: “I am delighted that [the] bill now includes express reference to fair use, news reporting, and news commentary. I continue to
believe, as our House colleagues also affirm, that parody, satire, editorial, and other forms of expression will remain unaffected by this
legislation.”56 In January 1996 President Clinton signed the FTDA,
which was then codified at section 43(c) of the Lanham Act.57
D. 2006: Trademark Dilution Revision Act

In February 2005, Representative Lamar Smith introduced House

Bill 683, which proposed to revise section 43(c) to “correct” a few aspects of the cause of action.58 Those corrections included revising
the statutory language to reverse the effect of the Supreme Court’s
2003 interpretation of section 43(c) in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc.59 In Moseley, the Court ruled that a trademark owner must
prove actual dilution and cast doubt on whether the federal action
covered tarnishment.60
House Bill 683 responded to Moseley in two ways: making actionable the likelihood of dilution rather than only actual dilution, and
expressly including both blurring and tarnishment as viable theories
of dilution under federal law.61 A third major element of the proposed
revision, responsive to cases other than Moseley, aimed to narrow
the field of trademarks included within the meaning of a “famous

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

141 CONG. REC. 36190 (1995).
Id. at 36189.
141 CONG. REC. 38561 (1995).
Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat 985 (1996) (approved Jan. 16, 1996).
H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Rep. No. 109-23 at 5, 8 (2005).
537 U.S. 418, 432-33 (2003); H.R. Rep. No. 109-23 at 5.
Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432.
H.R. 683 § 2; H.R. REP. NO. 109-23 at 5, 8.
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mark,” eliminating niche fame and geographically limited fame.62
The revision also made clear that the field of eligible marks was
broader than some courts had found in one respect: the revised language protects both inherently distinctive marks and those with only
acquired distinctiveness.63
Representative Smith’s original 2005 bill changed only one aspect
of the statutory exclusions from dilution liability: “Noncommercial
use of a mark” became “Noncommercial use of a designation of
source.”64 He did not provide an explanation of that change when he
introduced the bill.65 The other statutory exclusions remained unchanged. Soon thereafter, in March 2005, the House Committee on
the Judiciary reported on the bill and recommended certain amendments.66 The Committee significantly revised the exclusions section
of the bill, with a stated reason being closer attention to First
Amendment issues.67 As amended by the Committee, the exclusions
section of the dilution statute did not contain the “noncommercial
use” language; it read in its entirety:
62. H.R. 683 § 2; H.R. REP. NO. 109-23 at 5, 8; cf. Jacob Jacoby, Considering the Who,
What, When, Where and How of Measuring Dilution, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 601, 602-606 (2008) (arguing that some niche fame is still recognized).
63. The Second Circuit in particular had restricted the field of famous marks eligible
for federal dilution protection only to famous, inherently distinctive marks. See, e.g.,
TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2001).
64. H.R. 683 § 3(c)(3)(B) (as introduced on Feb. 9, 2005); H.R. REP. NO. 109-23 at 19.
65. Two participants in subcommittee hearings on House Bill 683 strongly disagree
about the reasons for the change in language to “designation of source” in the original bill
and the change back to “mark or trade name” in the version that became law. See William
G. Barber, Dumping The “Designation of Source” Requirement From The TDRA: A Response
To The Alleged “Trademark Use Requirement In Dilution Cases”, 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 559, 561-70 (2008) (arguing that dilution liability may be
based on uses other than as a “designation of source,” and using the deletion of that
language from the bill to support that construction); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 541, 552-53 (2008) (arguing that “designation of source” simply restated
or clarified a trademark use requirement that existed under the FTDA and that the
change back to “mark or trade name” has no significance and retains a trademark
use requirement).
66. H.R. REP. NO. 109-23 at 1.
67. See id. at 25 (prepared statement of Rep. Howard Berman).
[A]n amendment was adopted in Subcommittee to address the First
Amendment and free speech issues that were raised at the hearing. The ACLU
voiced concerns about the possibility that critics could be stifled by the threat of
an injunction for mere likelihood of tarnishment. Furthermore, they were
concerned with the balance between the rights of trademark holders and the
First Amendment. ACLU joined with INTA [International Trademark
Association, an organization composed primarily of trademark owners] and
AIPLA [American Intellectual Property Law Association, an organization of
intellectual-property attorneys] in crafting a separate exemption from a
dilution cause of action for parody, comment and criticism.
Id. The Subcommittee to which Berman refers, whose amendments were accepted by the
whole Committee, is the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property.
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(3) Exclusions.—The following shall not be actionable as dilution
by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection:
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing
goods or services of the owner of the famous mark.
(B) Fair use of a famous mark by another person, other than as a
designation of source for the person’s goods or services, including
for purposes of identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the
famous mark owner.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.68

When the full House considered the amended bill, Representative
Berman stated on the floor that the bill
manages to balance trademark law with [F]irst [A]mendment concerns.
....
[And it] has now garnered the support of the ACLU for accommodating its [F]irst [A]mendment concerns. In section 2(c)(3), the bill
addresses the balance between the rights of trademark holders
and the [F]irst [A]mendment by providing an exemption for purposes of identifying and parodying, criticizing or commenting on
the famous mark.69

The House passed the amended bill and forwarded it to the Senate
for consideration.70
In March 2006, the Senate passed the bill, but with its own
amendments.71 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary revised the
exclusions to read as follows:
(3) Exclusions.—The following shall not be actionable as dilution
by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection:
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or
facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person
other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or
services, including use in connection with—
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare
goods or services; or
(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the
famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark
owner.
(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark.72

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

H.R. REP. NO. 109-23 at 2.
151 CONG. REC. H2123 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2005). But see sources cited supra note 50.
151 CONG. REC. H2123 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2005).
152 CONG. REC. S1923 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006).
Id. at S1922.
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The Committee did not issue a written report addressing its
changes, but on the floor, Senator Leahy explained the change to the
exclusions by stating, “Senator Hatch and I were successful in including language that definitively shelters important constitutionally
protected [F]irst [A]mendment freedoms from being caught up in the
liability net.”73 The Senate passed the bill by unanimous consent, and
no other concerns were raised on the record with respect to First
Amendment issues.74
When the House accepted the Senate’s amendments in September
2006, Representative Sensenbrenner noted that the amended bill
“creates a free-speech exclusion for noncommercial use of a mark,”75
and Representative Smith stated that the “amendments developed by
the subcommittee and the other body will more clearly protect traditional [F]irst [A]mendment uses, such as parody and criticism.”76 The
only Representative speaking against the bill was David Wu of Oregon.77 Representative Wu’s remarks focused on small businesses,
voicing concern that the bill would allow large companies to more
easily sue individuals and small businesses even when harm was not
apparent.78 President Bush signed the bill, known as the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act (TDRA), on October 6, 2006.79
In the FTDA, applying the common meaning of “commercial use in
commerce” and “noncommercial use” resulted in a complete contradiction between the prima facie case and the noncommercial use exclusion. The legislative history, on the other hand, provided a meaning of “noncommercial use” that fit well within the context of the statute—a use other than in commercial speech. The TDRA’s amendments to the exclusions in section 43(c), including revisions considered and rejected in favor of further amendments, left the language
“noncommercial use of a mark” from the FTDA intact, adding only
the term “any” before it. With no indication in either the statutory
text or the legislative history that the meaning of “noncommercial
use” changed from the FTDA,80 the speech-protective meaning still
holds following reinsertion of the exclusion in the TDRA.
73. Id. at S1923.
74. See id. at S1921-23.
75. 152 CONG. REC. H6964 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2006).
76. Id. at H6965.
77. See id. at H6963-65.
78. Id. at H6965. Rep. Wu’s only comment that might shade toward a speech concern,
as opposed to a concern for the change from actual dilution to likelihood of dilution was
this: “[W]e run the risk of trademark owners being able to lock up large portions of our
shared language. This . . . is especially troubling at a time when even colors and common
words can be granted trademark protection.” Id. But overall, his concerns with the bill did
not appear to be grounded in the First Amendment.
79. Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125).
80. In fact, all indications are that the exclusion was reinserted specifically to bolster
speech protection, which reinforces the retention of the meaning “a use other than in
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III. ”NONCOMMERCIAL USE” IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT CONTEXT
Before delving further into the connection between commercial
speech doctrine and trademark dilution, it is helpful to briefly address the broader question of the interplay between trademark law
and the First Amendment. Trademark law provides for private civil
actions by trademark owners, while the First Amendment by its express language forbids direct governmental regulation of speech. But
trademark law does not escape First Amendment scrutiny simply by
coming in the form of a private action rather than direct governmental regulation.81 The First Amendment constrains not only explicit
state and federal regulations of speech but also the availability of
speech-restrictive private civil actions under state or federal law.82
And although decisions exist that immunize trademark law from serious First Amendment scrutiny on the basis that trademarks are
“property,”83 those decisions have been persuasively discredited by
scholars84 and do not appear to significantly influence courts today.85

commercial speech.” See 152 CONG. REC. S1923 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006) (statement of
Sen. Leahy).
81. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (applying the First
Amendment to a libel action).
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts
have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid
restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters
not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law
only, though supplemented by statute. The test is not the form in which state
power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact
been exercised.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-5, 7 (2001) (noting that governmental
enforcement of various private actions is restrained by the First Amendment).
82. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 81, at 4-5, 7; see also Lee Ann W. Lockridge, The
Myth of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine as a Protector of Free Speech, 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 31 (2007) (explaining the parallel interaction between the
First Amendment and private copyright actions); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First
Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. Rev. 381, 385, 407-08 (2008) (agreeing
that trademark law is and should be restrained by the First Amendment and providing an
extended argument for her position, but also discussing a few recent cases discounting
First Amendment challenges and even denying the presence of state action).
83. See, e.g., Reddy Commc’ns, Inc. v. Envtl. Action Found., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
630, 633-34, 636 (D.D.C. 1977) (refusing to entertain defendant’s First Amendment defense
to a trademark infringement action by analogizing to Supreme Court decisions allowing
owners of private property to refuse to allow picketers to use the property, but denying the
trademark owner’s request for a preliminary injunction on other grounds); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing
private property cases to reject the defendant’s First Amendment argument on the ground
that “adequate alternative avenues of communication exist” (quoting Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972))).
84. See generally Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional
Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L.
REV. 158.
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The First Amendment can be used to refine trademark law, and Congress did just that in drawing from commercial speech doctrine to define the extent of the noncommercial use exclusion.
A. The Operation of Separate Commercial Speech Protection
In providing an exclusion from dilution liability for noncommercial
uses, section 43(c) relies on the distinction in First Amendment jurisprudence between “commercial speech” and other speech, which
might therefore be termed “noncommercial speech.” The structure of
that distinction and the meaning of “commercial speech” within that
body of law thus governs the construction of section 43(c).
Space does not allow a full discussion of First Amendment theory
and practice since the adoption of the Bill of Rights, or even a complete review of the history of commercial speech protection.86 In brief,
the Supreme Court significantly strengthened constitutional protection for expressive activities over the middle of the twentieth century.
Most of the Court’s cases during this time related to noncommercial
or “core” speech. Commercial speech began to gain traction as a form
of speech worthy of protection in the early 1970s.87 The Supreme
Court’s clearest pronouncement of constitutional protection for commercial speech arrived in 1976, with the decision in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.88 The
Court varies the level of First Amendment protection provided to
speech depending on how the speech itself is classified.89 Speech classified as “commercial” enjoys somewhat less protection than noncommercial speech.90

85. See Kerry L. Timbers & Julia Huston, The “Artistic Relevance Test” Just Became
Relevant: The Increasing Strength of the First Amendment as a Defense to Trademark
Infringement and Dilution, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1278, 1278-79, 1282-98 (2003) (discussing
developments in the law from 1989 through 2003 to support the claim that the “Second,
Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have all expressly rejected the alternative avenues
test” in trademark cases); But see San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 536 (1987) (ruling, in the trademark-analogous case of a special
federal statute protecting the word “Olympic,” the five-interlocking-ring Olympic logo, and
other devices, that the statute did not infringe upon protected rights of speech in part
because “[b]y prohibiting the use of one word for particular purposes, neither Congress nor
the USOC has prohibited the [defendant] from conveying its message”). For further
discussion of the “Olympic” case, see infra notes 95, 196.
86. For more on the history of commercial speech protection, written for the purpose
of addressing the place of trademarks and trademark law within that body of
jurisprudence, see Ramsey, supra note 50. See also Ramsey, supra note 82; Rebecca
Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 737 (2007).
87. See Ramsey, supra note 50, at 1130-34; see also Ramsey, supra note 82, at 390-95;
Tushnet, supra note 86, at 744-47.
88. 425 U.S. 748, 770-72 (1976).
89. See Ramsey, supra note 50 at 1131-32.
90. Id.
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Courts review regulations of commercial and noncommercial
speech using different standards. Under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, a regulation on commercial
speech that is not false or misleading must directly advance a substantial governmental interest and be no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.91 For noncommercial speech, the validity
of a speech regulation depends on the nature of the regulation. Content-based restrictions on noncommercial speech must be necessary
to achieve a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest.92 A content-neutral time, place, or manner
restriction on noncommercial speech, on the other hand, undergoes a
less rigorous analysis than a content-based restriction. The regulation must be “justified without reference to the content” of the
speech, “narrowly tailored to a significant governmental interest,”
and it must “leave open ample alternative channels” for the expression.93 And a valid regulation on conduct that includes expressive
elements must otherwise fall within the valid powers of the government, further a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, and contain only an incidental restriction on freedom of speech that is not greater than essential to further
the government’s nonspeech interest.94
Comparing commercial speech analysis to the varied noncommercial speech analyses demonstrates that while the treatment of commercial speech regulations is certainly close to that applied to contentneutral time, place, or manner regulations and expressive conduct
regulations, it is not identical.95 Content may play a role in restrictions

91. 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the
government’s power is more circumscribed. The State must assert a substantial
interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover
the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest. The limitation
on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal.
Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, the
restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation
may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the
government’s purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could be served as
well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive
restrictions cannot survive.
Id.

92. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
93. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
94. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
95. Cf. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,
536-37 (1987) (asking whether a federal restriction on use of the word “Olympic,”
enforceable by the USOC, survived First Amendment review by asking “whether the
incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are greater than necessary to further
a substantial governmental interest”).
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on commercial speech. Also, no alternate communications channel
analysis is required for commercial speech regulations, as it is with
time, place, or manner restrictions on noncommercial speech.96
B. Drawing the Commercial-Noncommercial Line
Reliance on the commercial-noncommercial distinction, whether in
a First Amendment context or in the context of the noncommercial
use exclusion for federal dilution actions, means that where the line
is drawn to separate commercial from noncommercial speech has
great significance. Complicating the line-drawing is the existence of
speech containing both commercial and noncommercial elements.
Courts applying the commercial speech doctrine have dealt with this
problem of mixed speech in a variety of circumstances.
In Bigelow v. Virginia, the Court treated an advertisement for an
abortion-provider referral service as protected speech without categorizing that advertisement as either commercial or noncommercial
speech.97 It did not focus on the advertisement’s strongly commercial
elements, even though earlier Court decisions excepted commercial
advertisements from First Amendment protections.98 The opinion
addressed the effect of the commercial nature of the advertisement
as follows:

A restriction on nonmisleading commercial speech may be justified if the
government’s interest in the restriction is substantial, directly advances the
government’s asserted interest, and is not more extensive than necessary to
serve the interest. Both this test and the test for a time, place or manner
restriction under O’Brien require a balance between the governmental interest
and the magnitude of the speech restriction. Because their application to these
facts is substantially similar, they will be discussed together.
Id. at 537 n.16 (citations omitted). The Court explained its use of O’Brien as opposed to a
stricter mode of scrutiny:
By prohibiting the use of one word for particular purposes, neither
Congress nor the USOC has prohibited the SFAA from conveying its message. .
. . Nor is it clear that [the law] restricts purely expressive uses of the word
“Olympic.” [It] restricts only the manner in which the SFAA may convey its
message. The restrictions on expressive speech properly are characterized as
incidental to the primary congressional purpose of encouraging and rewarding
the USOC’s activities.
Id. at 536.
96. See Lockridge, supra note 82, at 43-45, 47.
97. 421 U.S. 809, 818, 822-26 (1975).
98. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“This court has
unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of
communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and
municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may
not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are
equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising.”).
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The fact that the particular advertisement in appellant’s newspaper had commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser’s
commercial interests did not negate all First Amendment guarantees. The State was not free of constitutional restraint merely
because the advertisement involved sales or “solicitations,” or
because appellant was paid for printing it, or because appellant’s
motive or the motive of the advertiser may have involved financial
gain. The existence of commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the
First Amendment.
....
. . . The advertisement published in appellant’s newspaper did
more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained
factual material of clear “public interest.” Portions of its message,
most prominently the lines, “Abortions are now legal in New York.
There are no residency requirements,” involve the exercise of the
freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion.99

In minimizing the commerciality of the ad and emphasizing its social or public-interest elements, the Court indicated that not all advertisements were equal in its eyes for First Amendment purposes.
In the Court’s words, “[t]he diverse motives, means, and messages
of advertising may make speech ‘commercial’ in widely varying
degrees.”100 The Court made it clear that speech with commercial
motives might well be fully protected in certain circumstances, namely when the speech combines commercial activity with material of
public interest.101
The year after Bigelow, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the
Court again avoided defining “commercial speech” as such, although
it clearly brought commercial speech within the protective umbrella
of the First Amendment.102 The Court characterized the speech at issue as “speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction.”103 The Court also identified two “commonsense differences”
between commercial speech and other protected speech to justify the
separation of commercial from noncommercial speech.104 First, it observed that commercial speech is more objective than noncommercial
speech, asserting that in commercial speech truth and falsity are
more easily verified.105 Second, the Court noted that commercial

99. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818, 822 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
100. Id. at 826.
101. Id.
102. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762-65 (1976).
103. Id. at 771 n.24 (quoting Pittsburg Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413
U.S. 376, at 385 (1973).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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speech, because it is motivated by profit, should have greater durability, or “hardiness” than noncommercial speech.106
In the 1980 case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission, the Court created an analytical framework
for commercial speech protection.107 But it did not provide much
assistance in identifying “commercial speech” in the first instance.
The Court variously defined “commercial speech” as narrowly as
“speech proposing a commercial transaction”108 and as broadly as
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience.”109
Very shortly after Central Hudson, the Court issued its decision in
Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment.110 In
Schaumberg, the Court treated solicitation of funds for charitable
purposes as speech fully protected by the First Amendment.111 In so
doing, the Court made the following statements about speech with a
mixture of commercial and noncommercial elements:
Prior authorities . . . clearly establish that charitable appeals
for funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech
interests—communication of information, the dissemination and
propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes—that
are within the protection of the First Amendment. Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation but
the latter must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that
solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and
perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or
for particular views on economic, political, or social issues, and
for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease. Canvassers in such contexts
are necessarily more than solicitors for money. Furthermore, because charitable solicitation does more than inform private economic decisions and is not primarily concerned with providing
information about the characteristics and costs of goods and services, it has not been dealt with in our cases as a variety of purely
commercial speech.112

Three years after Schaumberg classified certain mixed speech as
fully protected, the Court classified other mixed speech as commercial speech subject to less First Amendment protection. It used an alternate paradigm, ignoring the “intertwined” nature of the mixed
106. Id.
107. 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see also supra note 91.
108. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
109. Id. at 561-62. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens noted and criticized the wide
gulf between the two definitions. Id. at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
110. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
111. Id. at 639.
112. Id. at 632.

358

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:337

speech that was the focus of Schaumberg. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., the Court held that when speech does more than
propose a commercial transaction, thus falling outside the narrowest
definition, it may still be “commercial speech” based upon a combination of elements: presentation in an advertising form, reference to a
specific product, and a speaker’s economic motivation. These elements echo the Bigelow statement that the commerciality of an advertisement will vary as a result of “diverse motives, means, and
messages.”115 Under Bolger, not all speech related to commerce will
be treated as commercial speech, although some will.
National Federation of the Blind v. Riley, decided five years later,
hearkened back to Schaumberg rather than Bolger, although the
Court modified the language it used to characterize protected mixed
speech.116 The Schaumberg Court fully protected the speech where
the commercial and noncommercial elements were “characteristically
intertwined.”117 In Riley, however, the Court gave full speech protection to partially commercial speech due to the “inextricably intertwined” nature of certain commercial and noncommercial speech elements.118 In that case, the state regulation being challenged required
professional fundraisers involved in charitable solicitation to disclose
certain financial information to potential donors before making an
appeal for funds.119 The noncommercial, fully protected speech of charitable solicitation was therefore judged to be “inextricably intertwined” with the mandated commercial speech, leading to full protection for all of the speech.120
This use of the term “inextricably” in Riley (versus Schaumberg’s
“characteristically”) led in no small part to the decision one year later
in Board of Trustees v. Fox.121 In Fox, the Court declined to provide
full First Amendment protection, instead giving the somewhat lower
113

114

113. 463 U.S. 60 (1983). The defendant condom manufacturer had distributed
pamphlets, some of which discussed venereal disease and condom use at length, and
included the defendant’s name and identified its condom brand only at the bottom of the
last page of the eight-page pamphlet. Id. at 62 n.4. These pamphlets were not, then, merely
proposals to engage in commercial transactions, but yet the Court characterized the
defendant’s speech as commercial speech. Id. at 66-68. The Court explained the
characterization by noting that the pamphlets (a) were conceded to be advertisements
disseminated in return for payment of money, (b) referenced a specific product, and (c)
were mailed with an economic motive. Id. at 66-67. The Court stated that while speech
bearing only one of those characteristics would not be commercial speech, speech bearing a
combination of all of those characteristics was commercial speech. Id. at 67.
114. Id. at 67.
115. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975).
116. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
117. Vill. of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
118. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
119. Id. at 795.
120. Id. at 796.
121. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
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Central Hudson-level protection, to “Tupperware parties” in university dormitories on the basis that
the AFS “Tupperware parties” the students seek to hold “propose a
commercial transaction,” which is the test for identifying commercial speech. They also touch on other subjects, however, such as
how to be financially responsible and how to run an efficient home.
Relying on [Riley], respondents contend that here pure speech and
commercial speech are “inextricably intertwined,” and that the entirety must therefore be classified as noncommercial. We disagree.
. . . [In Riley], of course, the commercial speech (if it was that)
was “inextricably intertwined” because the state law required it to
be included. By contrast, there is nothing whatever “inextricable”
about the noncommercial aspects of these presentations. No law of
man or of nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without
teaching home economics, or to teach home economics without
selling housewares.122

The Supreme Court’s varied descriptions of the nature of commercial speech have left the lower courts with a number of analytical
tools to apply in categorizing speech. The Courts of Appeals have
dealt with speech presenting both commercial and noncommercial
elements in several ways. The Ninth Circuit has, at times, relied on
the Riley and Fox language of speech that is “inextricably intertwined.” For example, in Gaudiya Vaishnava Society v. City and
County of San Francisco, several nonprofit organizations claimed
that their sales of t-shirts and other merchandise merited full First
Amendment protection because the items were emblazoned with core
speech, namely political, religious, and philosophical messages.123 The
Ninth Circuit utilized Fox, Riley, and Schaumberg to decide the
case.124 It held that because the merchandise was sold “in order to
disseminate [the] organizations’ message[s],” the activity of selling
communicative merchandise was, as a whole, noncommercial and fully protected, even though the sales activity was commercial.125
“Where the pure speech and commercial speech by the nonprofits
during these activities is inextricably intertwined, the entirety must
be classified as noncommercial and we must apply the test for fully
protected speech.”126 The court did not refuse to find the speech to be
inextricably intertwined with the commercial sales simply because
the organizations could have disseminated their news through free

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 473-74 (citations omitted).
952 F.2d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1064.
Id.
Id.
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distribution of printed material rather than through the commercial
sale of goods.127
The Ninth Circuit again used the intertwined nature of commercial and communicative elements, as well as the Bolger model of
weighing varied speech characteristics, in a right of publicity and
Lanham Act false endorsement action brought by actor Dustin Hoffman against a magazine.128 Hoffman objected to an altered photograph showing his “Tootsie” character dressed in a designer gown
and shoes different than the gown and shoes shown in the original
photograph, when that photograph was used as part of an article
touting new designer fashions.129 Another portion of the magazine
provided stores and prices for the gown and shoes in the photograph,
and at least one of the featured designers also advertised in that
magazine issue.130
In granting full First Amendment protection to the article and
photograph, the appellate court disagreed with the district court’s assessment that the article was pure commercial speech.131 It began
with the premise, taken from Bolger and Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy, that the “core notion of commercial speech is that it does
no more than propose a commercial transaction.”132 It continued its
analysis by examining the mixture of commercial and noncommercial
elements within the article and accompanying photographs:
If the altered photograph had appeared in a [designer’s] advertisement, then we would be facing [purely commercial speech]. But
[the defendant] did not use Hoffman’s image in a traditional advertisement printed merely for the purpose of selling a particular
product. . . . Nor did the article simply advance a commercial message. . . . Viewed in context, the article as a whole is a combination
of fashion photography, humor, and visual and verbal editorial
comment on classic films and famous actors. Any commercial aspects are “inextricably entwined” with expressive elements, and so
they cannot be separated out “from the fully protected whole.”
“[T]here are commonsense differences between speech that does no

127. Compare this reasoning to Fox, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court stressed that
because the commercial and noncommercial elements of speech in that case were not
“inextricably intertwined,” the speech regulation would be treated as a commercial speech
regulation for First Amendment purposes. 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989). If the Ninth Circuit
had focused on Fox alone, rather than the broader and more nuanced analysis represented
by Fox, Riley, and Schaumberg taken together (not to mention Bigelow and Bolger), it
might have found the speech to be unprotected. Courts interpreting the noncommercial use
exclusion in trademark dilution should, as I argue above, take just such a broader view.
128. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
129. Id. at 1183.
130. Id. at 1185.
131. Id. at 1184-85.
132. Id. at 1184 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983))
(internal quotations omitted).
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more than propose a commercial transaction and other varieties,”
and common sense tells us this is not a simple advertisement.
The district court also concluded that the article was not protected speech because it was created to attract attention. A printed
article meant to draw attention to the for-profit magazine in which
it appears . . . does not fall outside of the protection of the First
Amendment because it may help to sell copies.133

The court did not ask whether the magazine could have written an
article commenting on classic films and famous actors without introducing a commercial element, such as the display of current designer
fashions, or whether the display of current designer fashions itself
deserved full First Amendment protection. Instead, it focused on
whether the blending of commercial and noncommercial elements in
the article and photograph created a noncommercial whole.134 The
Ninth Circuit ruled that it did.135
In a case involving sales of t-shirts printed with messages—
somewhat factually similar to one of the Ninth Circuit cases discussed above—the Seventh Circuit found the sale of the shirts to constitute a fully protected speech interest despite the mixture of commercial and noncommercial elements.136 And it did so almost without
acknowledging the mixed nature of the speech. The City of Chicago
tried to use its “Peddlers’ Ordinance” to prevent an advocate of marijuana legalization from selling message-laden shirts within certain
districts of the city, which included Grant Park and its surrounds.137
In affirming a preliminary injunction allowing the sale of the shirts
pending further adjudication of the constitutionality of the statute,
the court stated, without directly utilizing any of the foregoing
mixed-speech analysis, as follows:
The T-shirts that the plaintiff sells carry an extensive written
message of social advocacy; they are the equivalent of the sandwich boards that union pickets sometimes wear. . . . [T]here is
no question that the T-shirts are a medium of expression prima facie protected by the free-speech clause of the First Amendment,
and they do not lose their protection by being sold rather than
given away.
....

133. Id. at 1185-86 (quoting Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc’y v. City & County of San
Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1990); Va. State Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976)) (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 1186.
135. Id. Once again, nuanced attention to the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence––looking at a range of cases rather than isolated statements, guided the
court’s decision.
136. Ayres v. City of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1997).
137. Id. at 1012.
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To argue that the right of free speech is limited to cases
in which speech is disseminated free of charge would amount
to arguing that the City of Chicago could ban the sale of newspapers. . . . Just as the publishers of newspapers defray a portion of
their costs by the sale of their papers, so [the advocacy group]
defrays a portion and perhaps the entirety of its costs by the sale
of its T-shirts, which are . . . the vehicle of [the advocate’s] ideas
and opinions.138

Other appellate courts have applied Bolger with some elaboration
when analyzing mixed speech, leaving out the Fox, Riley, and
Schaumberg “intertwined” analysis. The Fifth Circuit, in Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., asked whether a primary purpose of the
speech at issue was commercial or noncommercial.139 The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Wenger140 looked at the Bolger characteristics
as well as whether the speech at issue was “grounded in commercial
transactions of the kind that the state has traditionally regulated.”141
It emphasized the relationship of commercial speech regulation to
traditional economic regulation, using that relationship to aid in
identifying commercial speech.142 “The distinction between commer138. Id. at 1014, 1017.
139. 242 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2001).
The question whether an economic motive existed is more than a question
whether there was an economic incentive for the speaker to make the speech;
the Bolger test also requires that the speaker acted substantially out of
economic motivation. Thus, for example, speech that is principally based on
religious or political convictions, but which may also benefit the speaker
economically, would fall short of the requirement that the speech was
economically motivated.
....
This does not mean that whenever the primary motivation for speech is
economic, the speech is commercial. . . . . The difference between commercial
speech and noncommercial speech is, after all, “a matter of degree.”
Id. at 552-53 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423
(1993)). The Procter & Gamble decision addressed the proper treatment of mixed speech in
the context of a Lanham Act false advertising claim based on admittedly false statements
about Procter & Gamble made by an Amway distributor. Id.. at 542-546. The status of the
distributor’s speech within the First Amendment hierarchy mattered, according to the
court, because the constitutional burden of proof for liability based on false statements
(from strict liability to liability only upon proof of actual malice) varies with the status of
the speech. Id. at 547. The court utilized the characteristics differentiating commercial
from noncommercial speech in determining the proper treatment of the mixed speech at
issue, and it found some of those characteristics to be helpful: durability of the speech due
to economic motivation, and verifiability of the truthfulness of the speech. See id. at 55051. In this case, the court appears to have been willing to engage in the convoluted exercise
of sorting out commercial from noncommercial speech and applying the Supreme Court’s
standards for burdens of proof (also including public figure versus private figure
considerations) because it found significant value in maintaining the ability of private
parties to tightly regulate false commercial speech. Id. at 547-59.
140. 427 F.3d 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
141. Id. at 848 (quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979)).
142. Id. at 847.
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cial and non-commercial speech rests on the ‘common-sense’ grounds
that the former ‘occurs in an area traditionally subject to government
regulation.’ . . . ‘[T]he State’s power to regulate commercial transactions justifies its concomitant power to regulate commercial speech
that is linked inextricably to those transactions.’ “143
In sum, lower courts, and even the Supreme Court, select among
the speech-categorizing analytical tools in order to match the speech
and its regulatory context. All of the analytical tools examine the
content of the speech, not just its form. And in all of these analyses, a
mixture of commercial and communicative motives and elements can
support noncommercial speech status.
The governmental justification for regulating the speech also
plays a role. The “core” of commercial speech is the proposition of a
commercial transaction, and it is this core that has been used to justify its greater regulation than other types of speech. Trademark law
purports to affect not the ultimate commercial transaction, but only a
commercially communicative aspect of a transaction—the sourceidentification aspect. As such, care needs to be taken to ensure that
trademark dilution law does not overreach beyond regulating the
core commercial communication, as it would then begin to improperly
restrain noncommercial speech.144
When giving meaning to the noncommercial use exclusion in the
trademark dilution context, several options are available—but all indicate that mixed motives would not disqualify a use from the exclusion. And the content of the use should matter, not just the form in
which the use appears, such as on a commercially marketed product
or service. Courts applying the noncommercial use exclusion should
carefully consider the nuanced analysis of commercial speech and its
regulation, as set forth in this Article. If they do so, they should see
that the noncommercial use exclusion includes mixed speech – rather

143. Id. at 846 (quoting 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996);
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)). The Wenger court elected to apply intermediate,
Central Hudson-level scrutiny to a compelled statement (requiring disclosure when a
person is touting a stock if consideration of any kind will be or has been paid to the person)
because the compelled statement arose in the context of speech related to commercial stock
transactions. Id. at 846-47. The court explained:
Common sense suggests that [the speech] is primarily akin to commercial
advertising and subject to less protection than purely information-based speech.
....
Although there are some elements of entertainment and information
contained in the [communications], they do little more than propose a commercial
transaction, namely, the purchase of shares in a company.
Id. at 847.
144. See infra Part IV.A.
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than leaving that speech in an indeterminate status or wholly within
the scope of dilution liability.145
IV. THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF THE EXCLUSION
Part II of this Article presented the legislative history of the
FTDA and TDRA, replete with references to using the noncommercial use exclusion to protect expressive uses from dilution liability.
Part III explained how the commercial-noncommercial speech distinction operates in First Amendment law. Here, Part IV discusses
how and why the noncommercial use exclusion should be interpreted
and applied based on the commercial-noncommercial distinction from
First Amendment jurisprudence. This interpretation of the exclusion
makes the entire statute both more predictable and consistent with
the intent of Congress.
Part IV begins by examining court decisions that properly applied
the exclusion. It then discusses how interpreting the exclusion broadly, consistent with the understanding of “noncommercial” developed
in First Amendment jurisprudence, helps to protect the TRDA as a
whole from being invalidated as an unconstitutional restraint on expression. Finally, it responds to certain objections to using the noncommercial use exclusion as an affirmative defense that limits dilution liability to commercial speech.
A. ”Noncommercial Use” as a Broad Category Including Mixed
Speech
Several well-reasoned decisions within the Ninth Circuit have interpreted the noncommercial use exclusion to mean that use of a
mark in mixed speech is exempt from dilution liability, rather than
restricting the exclusion to speech that is entirely noncommercial.
This is the only interpretation of the statute that is consistent with
the legislative history of federal dilution laws, taken together with
the range of First Amendment jurisprudence. If other courts adopt a
similarly broad application of the exclusion, it will provide more predictable results in litigation and an earlier end to dilution claims in
appropriate cases.
In the first reported decision applying the exclusion, Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., the District Court for the
Southern District of California rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
a use was commercial within the meaning of the dilution exclusion.146
Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the defendant’s use of the Seuss
marks (primarily, a drawing of a person that was reminiscent of the
145. Id.
146. 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1574 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
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Cat in the Hat, including the striped stovepipe hat claimed by Seuss
as a separate mark) was not a “noncommercial [use] because the
marks were used to ‘make their book more entertaining and to consequently, sell more copies.’ “147 The court referred to both the legislative history of the dilution statute and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy to conclude that “an expressive use is not rendered commercial
by the impact of the use on sales.”148 As a result, the court found the
use was “noncommercial” and therefore within the noncommercial
use exclusion.149 The court did not expressly address “mixed” speech,
but its reasoning acknowledged that some uses with commercial characteristics should still fall within the exclusion.150
Five years later, the Ninth Circuit properly interpreted the noncommercial use exclusion to protect mixed speech. Mattel, Inc., owner
of rights to the BARBIE trademark, sued MCA Records over the use
of “Barbie” in the song “Barbie Girl,”151 alleging both trademark infringement and trademark dilution.152 The Ninth Circuit decided
Mattel’s trademark dilution claim by applying the noncommercial
use exclusion.153 The court explored the plain language and the legis-

147. Id. (citation omitted).
148. Id. The court cited Senator Hatch’s statement upon introducing the bill that the
noncommercial use exclusion included “parody, satire, editorial and other forms of
expression that are not part of a commercial transaction,” and the Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy definition of commercial speech as speech that, according to this court, “merely
proposes a commercial transaction.” Id. (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); 141 CONG. REC. 38559 (1995) (statement
of Sen. Hatch)).
149. Id. The district court nevertheless issued a preliminary injunction based on the
plaintiff’s copyright and trademark infringement claims, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed
(without addressing the issue of dilution). See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA,
Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997).
150. Dr. Seuss, 924 F. Supp. at 1574.
151. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002).
152. Id. The Ninth Circuit used a First Amendment-infused balancing test to
determine the issue of trademark infringement. Id. at 901. The Mattel court relied on the
Second Circuit’s decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi, which referred to the First Amendment’s
protection for artistic works in creating a balancing test providing creative freedom to the
titles of artistic works while not excepting those titles altogether from trademark
infringement liability. 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit did not, in that
case, directly rule on any constitutional questions with respect to the title of the work. Id.
at 998-1002. The Ninth Circuit followed that lead in Mattel. Because the use of “Barbie” in
the title of “Barbie Girl” related closely to the content of the song (which satirized the
cultural values underlying the Barbie doll phenomenon), and because the title did not
mislead as to the source of the song by suggesting that it was produced by the makers of
the doll, the court found no trademark infringement. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902, 900-01
(“Simply put, the trademark owner does not have the right to control public discourse
whenever the public imbues his mark with a meaning beyond its source-identifying
function. . . . The song does not rely on the Barbie mark to poke fun at another subject but
targets Barbie herself. . . . [W]here an artistic work targets the original and does not
merely borrow another’s property to get attention, First Amendment interests weigh more
heavily in the balance.”).
153. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903-07.
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lative history in construing the statute.154 It decided that the exclusion for “noncommercial use” was not surplusage and was intended to
ease First Amendment tensions in the dilution statute.155 Of particular interest is the court’s finding that the “commercial use in commerce” requirement of the prima facie case in the FTDA utilized a
meaning of “commercial use” that was different than the meaning of
commercial use in the context of the “noncommercial use” exception
in section 43(c)(3)(B).156 It found the “commercial use in commerce”
requirement to be satisfied because MCA had sold commercial products bearing the BARBIE mark, namely the album containing the
song entitled “Barbie Girl” and the song’s single.157 In the view of the
court, these uses constituted the required “use of a famous and distinctive mark to sell goods other than those produced or authorized
by the mark’s owner.”158
The Ninth Circuit determined that the “noncommercial use” exclusion should be defined entirely by reference to the definition of
commercial speech in First Amendment jurisprudence.159 The court
made this decision based on its review of the exclusion’s legislative
history.160 The court looked to its own decisions for this definition,
primarily Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.161 The Hoffman court
explained that the “ ‘core notion of commercial speech’ is that it ‘does
no more than propose a commercial transaction.’ “162 Hoffman thus
relied on that definition and on Riley163 to find that when speech is
not “purely commercial speech”—when it is “ ‘inextricably entwined
with . . . expressive elements’ “—it is fully protected by the First
Amendment.164 Accordingly, the Mattel court held that the intertwined, mixed speech in the case before it fell within the noncommercial use exemption to the dilution statute.165

154. Id.
155. Id. at 904-06.
156. Id. at 903.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 905-06.
160. Id.; see also supra Part II.
161. Mattel, 296. F.3d at 906 (relying on Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d
1180 (9th Cir. 2001)).
162. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 66 (1983)). Bolger, in turn, refers back to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy for the
characterization that commercial speech “does no more than propose a commercial
transaction.” Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66 (quoting Va. State Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)); see also supra Part III.B.
163. The court also used Riley’s Ninth Circuit progeny in defining commercial speech.
See supra text accompanying notes 123-28.
164. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185.
165. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906-07. The Ninth Circuit did not address the lingering Fox
question of when commercial and noncommercial speech elements are “inextricably
intertwined,” as opposed to merely intertwined at the pleasure of the speaker.
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The Mattel court’s broad view of noncommercial use is the only interpretation consistent with the legislative history and the overall
purpose and structure of federal trademark dilution law. An effective
dilution statute aims to provide relief to a trademark owner when a
noncompeting use of a mark may not cause confusion but does, at
least marginally, diminish the previously strong connection between
a mark and its source.166 The federal dilution law contains broad language in the prima facie case to cover all such diminutions of sourceidentifying strength167 but then provides a broad exemption from liability for all uses not constituting purely commercial speech. It does
so in order to provide strong speech protection in the face of the general liability provision.
A broad reading of the noncommercial use exemption is consistent
with the rationale for why the First Amendment review of commercial speech restrictions differs from the review of noncommercial
speech restrictions. In the traditional justification for the distinction,
the line between commercial and noncommercial speech exists to ensure that, even in the face of the First Amendment, economic transactions may be regulated, including the speech directly connected to
those transactions. The line drawing is done to insulate the economic
regulation and speech tightly connected thereto from the most stringent speech-related oversight so that the government can “insur[e]

In Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796-99 (9th Cir. 2003), the
Ninth Circuit again had the opportunity to determine whether a use of the BARBIE
trademark and trade dress constituted infringement or dilution. The court approached the
defendant’s use of the BARBIE mark in the titles of his photographs (which featured
Barbie dolls in rather bizarre settings) in the same way it had approached the use of the
BARBIE mark in the title of the song “Barbie Girl” in Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records. Id. at
807. It concluded that “the public interest in free and artistic expression greatly outweighs
its interest in potential consumer confusion about Mattel’s sponsorship of Forsythe’s
works.” Id. It rejected the trade dress infringement claim on the basis that the use of the
Barbie doll trade dress in the photographs was nominative fair use. See id. at 808-12. The
court then cited its earlier Mattel decision for the proposition that a “dilution action only
applies to purely commercial speech,” and in doing so referred specifically to the portion of
the earlier opinion discussing the First Amendment conflict that would inhere in the
dilution statute if it did not exempt protected noncommercial speech. Id. at 812 (citing
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 904, 906). The court did not elaborate further on the proper
interpretation of the noncommercial use exclusion or the commercial use requirement of
the prima facie case.
166. Dilution statutes focus upon the strength of the source-mark connection in
consumers’ minds, even when the statutes are not as narrow as the Schechter vision that
would protect only “unique” source-mark connections. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3
(1995) (stating that the dilution action would protect famous marks from unauthorized
uses that “reduce[] the public’s perception that the mark signifies something unique,
singular, or particular”); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
167. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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that the stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as
freely.”168
In the dilution statute, however, Congress drew a line between
commercial and noncommercial speech to heighten protection for
nonmisleading speech connected to a commercial transaction, rather
than to lower protection for the transaction-related expression or
otherwise regulate the transaction itself. The “commercial” aspect of
the transaction is captured by the broad language linking the potential for dilution liability to any “use of a mark or trade name in commerce.”169 The noncommercial use exemption releases noncommercial
uses from the previously captured commercial aspect. The commercial-noncommercial line in the dilution statute protects expression;
including mixed speech within the noncommercial use exclusion fulfills the congressional as well as the contextual purposes of the exclusion by protecting more expression.
All First Amendment analyses present a balance of competing interests—balancing an arguably legitimate governmental interest
against a speech interest—and the specifics of the balancing analysis
depend on the nature of the regulation and the speech at issue.170
Here, by giving defendants a general noncommercial use exclusion,
Congress did its own balancing on a categorical level rather than asking courts to engage in case-by-case balancing to determine whether
dilution liability, as applied to a specific use, is a valid limit on the
defendant’s First Amendment freedom.171 The statute reflects a con168. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772
(1976). A plurality opinion of the Court in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island explained
the operation of most commercial-noncommercial speech distinctions:
Our opinion [in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy] noted that the greater
“objectivity” of commercial speech justifies affording the [government] more
freedom to distinguish false commercial advertisements from true ones, and
that the greater “hardiness” of commercial speech, inspired as it is by the profit
motive, likely diminishes the chilling effect that may attend its regulation.
Subsequent cases explained that the [government’s] power to regulate
commercial transactions justifies its concomitant power to regulate commercial
speech that is “linked inextricably” to those transactions. . . . Nevertheless, as
we explained in [Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,
96 (1977)], the [government] retains less regulatory authority when its
commercial speech restrictions strike at “the substance of the information
communicated” rather than the “commercial aspect of [it]—with offerors
communicating offers to offerees.”
517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
170. See supra Part III.A.
171. This Article argues for application of the noncommercial use exclusion as a categorical affirmative defense. I use the term “categorical” to indicate that once the defendant’s use is determined to fall within “noncommercial use,” the analysis ends, and the
court rules in favor of the defendant. By contrast, under a typical First Amendment analysis, after finding noncommercial speech, the court would then begin balancing the defen-
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gressional determination that arguably diluting, noncommercial uses
do not pose such a risk of commercial harm to trademark owners that
regulation of those uses via dilution is warranted. Under the statute
Congress created, the noncommercial statute of a use “trumps,” in a
sense, any commercial harm that may be posed by that use. To the
extent Congress was thinking in clear First Amendment terms, one
might say that Congress determined that the expressive value of
those uses, as a group, outweighed the risk of serious commercial
harm posed by those uses.172
The decision to protect expressive uses from dilution liability (but
not necessarily infringement liability)173 is consistent with the traditional First Amendment protection given to speech which is neither
commercially deceptive nor commercially fraudulent.174 This is not to

dant’s speech interest against the trademark liability rule. See supra text accompanying
notes 91-94.
172. The Supreme Court also, at times, strikes categorical balances rather than relying
only on case-by-case, ad hoc balancing by individual judges of speech and governmental
interests. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court used standards of liability to further
define a categorical balance between the legitimate governmental interest underlying
defamation law and the free speech interest of the media in engaging in discussion of
public officials and figures, in contrast to the speech interest in discussing private
individuals. 418 U.S. 323, 342-44 (1974), In defense of its categorization, the Court stated
the following:
Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs of the press and the
individual’s claim to compensation for wrongful injury might be struck on a
case-by-case basis. As Mr. Justice Harlan hypothesized, “it might seem, purely
as an abstract matter, that the most utilitarian approach would be to scrutinize
carefully every jury verdict in every libel case, in order to ascertain whether the
final judgment leaves fully protected whatever First Amendment values
transcend the legitimate state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who
prevailed.” But this approach would lead to unpredictable results and
uncertain expectations, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower
courts unmanageable. Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests
at stake in each particular case is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of
general application. Such rules necessarily treat alike various cases involving
differences as well as similarities. Thus it is often true that not all of the
considerations which justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each
particular case decided under its authority.
Id. at 343-44 (citation omitted).
173. In contrast to arguably diluting uses, infringing uses risk multiple harms—to
consumers and to proprietary interests. Accordingly, even expressive uses of marks that
create a likelihood of confusion do not enjoy categorical immunity from infringement
liability, although they might be protected based on the particular circumstances of a case.
See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d
Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). For further discussion of
expressive uses in the likelihood of confusion context, see Pratheepan Gulasekaram,
Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized
Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887 (2005). For an argument that
infringement claims and trademark law generally deserve greater First Amendment
scrutiny than is currently the case, see Ramsey, supra note 82.
174. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501-04.
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say that noncommercial uses cannot dilute commercial selling power
by diminishing the commercial strength of the source-mark connection. The point is simply that noncommercial uses, as a whole, carry
a lower risk of significant commercial effects—a level of risk of harm
that pales in comparison to the likely chilling effect on noncommercial uses if those uses are not excused as a clear, categorical matter.
Congress made the choice to privilege the broad category of noncommercial uses rather than to regulate the diluting effect of those uses,
and courts should respect and enforce that decision as it is expressed
by the statutory exclusion.
B. Constitutionality of Restricting Only Commercial Speech
Interpreting “noncommercial use” to include any use other than
“commercial speech”—speech proposing a commercial transaction—
means that the dilution statute presents solely a regulation of commercial speech. As a commercial speech regulation, it is still subject
to direct First Amendment analysis—after all, statutes discriminating between commercial and noncommercial speech, and then restricting only commercial speech, are not immune from First
Amendment attack.175 But in this case, broadly interpreting noncommercial use to limit dilution claims to apply only to commercial
speech indicates that the exclusion helps to tailor the dilution statute
to serve its specific purpose. This makes the TDRA more likely to

When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from
misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the disclosure
of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent
with the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech
and therefore justifies less than strict review. However, when a State entirely
prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages
for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is
far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment
generally demands.
Sound reasons justify reviewing the latter type of commercial speech
regulation more carefully. Most obviously, complete speech bans, unlike
content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, or manner of expression, are
particularly dangerous because they all but foreclose alternative means of
disseminating certain information.
Id. at 501 (citation omitted).
175. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422-28
(1993) (refusing to validate Cincinnati’s restriction on commercial newsracks (but not on
newsracks for newspapers) under a commercial speech analysis in light of the fact that the
city had not demonstrated a basis for distinguishing between types of newsracks or an
interest in preventing a commercial harm posed by the newsracks); see also LaFrance,
supra note 50; Rebecca Tushnet, Truth and Advertising: The Lanham Act and Commercial
Speech Doctrine, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 294-323 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008); Tushnet, supra
note 50, at 546-61.
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withstand a potential constitutional challenge under the Central
Hudson test for regulations of commercial speech.176
Trademark laws are a long-standing, traditional form of commercial speech regulation; but that status alone does not indicate that
the contours of trademark law do not need to be refined by attention
to First Amendment values. Dilution laws, both state and federal,
draw more First Amendment scrutiny from courts and commentators
than standard trademark infringement laws because they do not require any showing of consumer confusion. Standard infringement
causes of action require, at a minimum, that the trademark owner
show a likelihood of consumer confusion.177 Courts consider actual
confusion, but it is not required before liability will attach.178 The relevant confusion can be as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation,179
which means that noncompeting goods or services bearing the plaintiff’s mark, or one similar thereto, may still create liability for trademark infringement.180 Consumers may be crystal-clear on the fact
that the goods in fact come from different producers, but liability may
still attach due to likely confusion about a relationship between the
producers or some form of approval by the plaintiff of the allegedly
infringing use of the mark.181 A broad variety of confusing uses fall
within the scope of the action, but in any event, the court must find a
likelihood of some form of confusion.
The Central Hudson scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech
only applies to restrictions on truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech.182 The likelihood of confusion requirement in infringement
laws might appear to restrain only misleading commercial speech.

176. As explained in Part III.A. of this Article, Central Hudson is the measure courts
use to judge whether a regulation’s effect on commercial speech violates the First
Amendment. Despite substantial criticism of the Central Hudson analysis, see, e.g., Robert
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000), it
remains the governing paradigm for judicial review. As a result, in this Article I apply
Central Hudson to the dilution statute, although I do not herein endorse that analysis.
177. See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111,
117 (2004); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769-70 (1992); 15 U.S.C. §
1114(1)(a)-(b) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
178. See, e.g., Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633,
640 (1st Cir. 1992); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 87273 (2d Cir. 1986).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
180. See, e.g., McDonald’s Corp. v. Druck & Gerner, D.D.S., P.C., 814 F. Supp. 1127
(N.D.N.Y. 1993) (enjoining defendant’s use of MCDENTAL for a dental clinic based on a
likelihood of confusion with MCDONALD’S for primarily food-related goods and services).
181. See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 909-910 (2007) (listing cases representative of the
varying types of confusion addressed in the case law, including endorsement, affiliation,
association, connection, authorization, permission, and the like).
182. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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Accordingly, those statutes would receive no First Amendment scrutiny under Central Hudson:183
The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based
on the informational function of advertising. Consequently, there
can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely
to deceive the public than to inform it, or commercial speech related
to illegal activity.
If the [commercial] communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the government’s power is more circumscribed.184

Because the Central Hudson formulation excludes misleading commercial speech from its First Amendment scrutiny, few, if any, courts
are likely to find that enjoining a likely confusing commercial use of a
trademark violates the First Amendment.185
This blanket exculpation of infringement laws is not, however,
entirely without issue when viewed through a First Amendment
lens.186 Trademark infringement liability requires only likely, rather
than actual, confusion. Yet commercial speech jurisprudence asks
whether the speech is false or misleading, rather than whether it
might be, when determining whether the Central Hudson level of
protection applies. As other scholars have discussed in greater detail,
in other instances of government regulation of commercial speech,
the possibility of misleading consumers does not justify all regulations of professional advertising.187 Nevertheless, the connection between misleading consumers (Central Hudson) and trademark infringement liability has generally sufficed to end most serious First
Amendment discussion by a court.188
In contrast, dilution laws provide a trademark owner with a cause
of action even when no consumer confusion of any kind is likely. The
federal dilution cause of action allows for an injunction when a use of
183. See infra Part III.A.
184. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64 (citations omitted).
185. Cf. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (refusing to enjoin, upon
the challenge of famed dancer Ginger Rogers, the use of the title Fred and Ginger for a
movie about two ballroom dancers who used the stage names Fred and Ginger, but using a
balancing test rather than a blanket exclusion or defense).
186. See Ramsey, supra note 82, at 415.
187. See Tushnet, supra note 86 at 741-744 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
professional services advertising cases and their invalidation of prohibitions on potentially
misleading commercial speech, as contrasted with actually or inherently misleading
commercial speech); Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. & Prof’l Reg’n, 512 U.S. 136, 146
(1994); accord Ramsey, supra note 82.
188. Cf. Rogers, 875 F.2d 994, 998-99 (“Because overextension of Lanham Act
restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on First Amendment values, we must
construe the Act narrowly to avoid such a conflict.”).
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a mark or trade name in commerce is likely to dilute a famous mark,
“regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion.”189
A typical state dilution statute provides for injunctive relief when,
despite the lack of competition between parties, the defendant’s activities are likely to injure the business reputation of the plaintiff or are
likely to dilute the distinctive quality of plaintiff’s trademark.190 Both
federal and state dilution laws apply to situations where no confusion
exists. Without the requirement of confusion, or even the mere likelihood of confusion, diluting uses do not fall within Central Hudson’s
sidelining of misleading commercial speech. As a result, the First
Amendment becomes more likely to succeed as a valid defense to a dilution claim, as compared to an infringement claim.191
After threshold inquiries regarding the nature of the speech being
regulated, which inquiries are generally satisfied in the case of dilution as set forth above, Central Hudson first requires a court to find a
substantial governmental interest to justify the regulation.192 Standard explanations of dilution as well as the federal legislative history
indicate that the interest supporting the federal dilution law is to
provide famous trademarks with strong protection for their sourcemark distinctiveness.193 Mary LaFrance argues that the governmen189. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). Federal dilution liability comes in two forms,
blurring and tarnishment. For the applicable statutory language, see text accompanying
note 1. When the user of the diluting mark “willfully intended to trade on the recognition
of the famous mark” or “willfully intended to harm the reputation of the famous mark,”
monetary remedies are also available. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5).
190. See WELKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 14-21; DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK
DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 2008 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
5-9 (2008).
191. In 1982, Robert Denicola published a perceptive article assessing speech interests
intersecting with trademark actions and concluding that the dilution cause of action
posed a significantly greater risk of restricting or chilling protected speech than did
more traditional trademark infringement claims. Denicola, supra note 84, at 166-90
(arguing that both dilution and misappropriation, as rationales for trademark protection,
posed a significant threat to speech rights because they may be used to enjoin uses
where a trademark is used as a communicative vehicle rather than only trademark or
decorative uses).
192. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (“At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading.”).
193. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 at 3 (1995) (stating that the dilution action would
protect famous marks from unauthorized uses that “reduce[] the public’s perception that
the mark signifies something unique, singular, or particular”). That this justification
relates almost exclusively to the blurring form of dilution liability, see 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(2)(B)(2006), rather than the tarnishment form, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C), bears
comment. Tarnishment, given its close relationship to defamation and disparagement, and
the obvious potential for viewpoint discrimination, may require a different First
Amendment analysis altogether. See, e.g., LaFrance, supra note 50, at 711 (noting that
“dilution laws address two entirely different, and arguably unrelated, types of alleged
harms, which are typically shoehorned into a single statute”). My analysis focuses on
blurring and leaves the special issues of tarnishment to the side.

374

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:337

tal interest in providing a marginal increase in protection of goodwill
is not substantial because “any harm to the value of the trademarks
affected by dilutive speech interferes only with the ability of the
trademark owners to psychologically manipulate consumers. Preserving the ability of trademark owners to influence consumers in this
way does not amount to a substantial governmental interest.”194
While I may sympathize with her about the low value of the government’s interest on a theoretical level, it is almost unheard of for a
court to invalidate a commercial speech regulation on the basis of the
legitimacy of the governmental interest.195 Given the deferential
standard of review applied to this element of Central Hudson, the
government’s interest in providing an additional measure of protection to the goodwill of famous marks will satisfy this requirement.196
Central Hudson next inquires “whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,”197 meaning that the
regulation must do more than “provide[] only ineffective or remote
support for the government’s purpose.”198 Professor Rebecca Tushnet
argues that most uses of a trademark that alter the power and meaning of that mark are not actionable under the dilution statute when
noncommercial uses are excluded.199 I differ with her on this point
with respect to its connection to the question raised by Central Hudson. And perhaps we also differ on the nature of the governmental interest being accomplished.

194. LaFrance, supra note 50, at 719.
195. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 50, at 555 n.225. I do not argue that adding dilution
liability to the federal statute was the best policy choice that Congress could have made, or
that dilution liability is vital to the well-being of trademark owners. I only argue that this
is an interest likely to be accepted as sufficient to justify the statute under a Central
Hudson analysis.
196. For example, during its First Amendment review of the statute protecting the
word “Olympic” as a kind of über-trademark, the Court quickly moved past the
substantiality of the government’s interest, which was, in part, “to ensure that the USOC
[United States Olympic Committee] receives the benefit of its own efforts so that the
USOC will have an incentive to continue to produce a ‘quality product,’ that, in turn,
benefits the public.” San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 537 (1987). This governmental interest is indistinguishable from the basic interest
underlying all of trademark law, including dilution law. So despite the fact that the
“Olympic” statute had additional governmental interests asserted in support, such as the
varied “Olympic” values of athletic competition and international goodwill, I find it difficult
to imagine that the “substantial governmental interest” element of Central Hudson will, as
a practical matter, provide a barrier to the validity of federal dilution law.
197. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
198. Id. at 564.
199. This observation leads to Tushnet’s argument that the federal dilution statute
fails the third element of the Central Hudson analysis of a restriction on commercial
speech because the statute does not significantly advance the governmental purpose
underlying dilution, namely, the protection of a trademark owner’s investment in the
goodwill of the mark. See Tushnet, supra note 175, at 318-22.
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I see the governmental interest as a rather narrow interest in adding marginally to the protection of goodwill possessed by famous
marks.200 I agree that dilution liability does not reach all uses of
trademarks that would modify the mental associations that a trademark owner has worked to create.201 But dilution statutes do not actually attempt to reach all of these modifications—the federal statute
in particular tries to regulate the mark-source identification connection, which is the trademark’s distinctiveness as a mark.202 Trademark
goodwill contains that commercial connection, but it does not encompass all of the personal, emotive connections that may also arise in a
consumer’s mind in relation to a mark. To say it another way—not all
alterations of power and meaning of a famous mark dilute the trademark distinctiveness of that mark. “Distinctiveness” is not a synonym
for all of a mark’s associations, even all those associations purposely
cultivated by a trademark owner. Distinctiveness is restricted in
trademark law to the source-identifying meaning. Cultural power and
commercial identification power are not synonymous.
If we accept an asserted governmental interest of providing an
additional degree of protection to famous marks’ goodwill (i.e., their
source-identifying power) and the statutory construction of noncommercial use that excludes all but core commercial speech from liability, we can make a judgment about the relationship of the regulation
to the interest. With these premises, the noncommercial use exclusion actually means the dilution statute more accurately targets the
source-identifying connection possessed by a mark, as opposed to the
other connections associated with a mark. The exclusion bolsters the
argument that the TDRA directly advances, rather than only remotely supports, the governmental interest in preventing the limited
commercial harm of reduced distinctiveness in the marketplace.
Central Hudson asks finally “whether [the regulation] is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve [the government’s] interest,”203 an
inquiry that would not be satisfied “if the governmental interest could
be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial
speech.”204 The reasonableness of the tailoring in this instance depends
on whether Congress had reason to conclude that a use of a famous (or
similar) mark in commercial speech is more likely than a use in non200. See notes 193-96, supra, and accompanying text.
201. Tushnet, supra note 50, at 546-61.
202. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2006) (defining “dilution by blurring” as an “association
. . . that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark”). I readily concede that this aspect
of my argument cannot rely on the statutory or even theoretical basis for tarnishment
liability, which speaks to the harming of the “reputation of the famous mark.” But the
speech-impairing effects, and thus the constitutional vulnerability of liability based solely
on reputational harm, go far beyond the scope of this Article. See also supra notes 193-95.
203. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
204. Id. at 564.
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commercial speech to affect the source-good connection of a famous
mark and its commercial power in the marketplace. As discussed
above in connection with the “directly advance” prong of Central Hudson, if the governmental purpose is as narrow as I argue it is, then the
presence of the exclusion for noncommercial uses, particularly when
mixed uses are included in the excused category of uses, strengthens
the argument that the statute has been appropriately tailored. When
noncommercial uses are excluded, and when the exclusion is as broadly viewed as I argue it should be, then dilution reaches only those
commercial speech uses that are likely to have the clearest commercial
effect on the mark-source connection sought to be protected by dilution. As such, a broadly interpreted noncommercial speech exclusion
bolsters arguments in favor of dilution’s constitutionality.
C. Noncommercial Use as an Affirmative Defense
1. A Predictable and Efficient Procedural Mechanism
The noncommercial use exclusion is designed to be used as an affirmative defense. The function of a statutory affirmative defense is
to provide for an escape from liability for a defendant even if the
plaintiff can prove some risk of harm or even certain harm. This
function was confirmed by the Supreme Court in KP Permanent
Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. in the context of the Lanham Act section 33(b)(4) fair use defense to trademark infringement
liability.205 In the same way, when a statute includes specific exclusions to the general liability provision, the very function of those exclusions is to narrow the liability reach of an otherwise broad provision.206 Just as a use of a mark that poses some likelihood of confusion may still be fair for purposes of the section 33(b) fair use defense, a use of a mark that poses a likelihood of dilution may be noncommercial and thus exempt from dilution liability.
205. 543 U.S. 111, 118-24 (2004). Although the Court made it clear in its decision that
some possibility of confusion would not be sufficient to preclude the application of the fair
use defense, it left room for lower courts to interpret the section 33(b)(4) requirement that
a mark be used “fairly and in good faith” in a way that takes into account the degree of
likelihood of confusion that may be engendered by a use. Id. at 123. The Ninth Circuit has
taken that leeway as an open door to continue utilizing likelihood of confusion as a major,
if not the major, consideration in the fair use defense. See KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 609 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “the degree of
customer confusion remains a factor in evaluating fair use”); see also William McGeveran,
Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV., 49, 84-87 (2008) (criticizing the Ninth
Circuit’s position on fair use and likelihood of confusion).
206. Section 33(b) does, to be entirely fair, specifically characterize fair use as one of
the “defenses or defects” to which an infringement case involving an incontestable mark is
subject, see 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b), while section 43(c) uses the term “exclusions.” 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c). In the context of the dilution statute as a whole, however, the words are
interchangeable; it is a distinction without a difference.
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At least two scholars view noncommercial use as a restatement or
confirmation of the extent of the prima facie case, rather than as a
defense excusing certain uses from dilution liability even if the uses
otherwise fall within the statutory language.207 Some courts have not
applied the defense in a procedurally consistent manner, taking the
exclusion only as, it might seem, an affirmative sign that First
Amendment balancing needs to be performed.208 Neither of these ap207. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 65, at 554. Professors Dogan and Lemley
disagree with a characterization of noncommercial use as an affirmative defense, although
they do so in a context other than a discussion of the burden of proof. Dogan and Lemley
make their observations about the use of “exclusion” versus “defense” in order to bolster
their argument on “trademark use.” See id. at 554 n.64 (“It is also worth noting that [15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)] is styled as ‘exclusions’ from the scope of the act, not as defenses to an
otherwise viable cause of action, further undermining the idea that the presence of a
‘designation of source’ or ‘noncommercial use’ limitation in that section implies that the
general bill reaches further than that.”). There is difficulty, however, in placing weight on
the use of the word “exclusions” for any substantive determination of the issue. For
example, the § 107 fair use provision in copyright law is introduced by language stating
that “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (2006). And yet the Supreme Court hesitated not at all in stating in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., that “fair use is an affirmative defense,” despite that statutory
language. 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). Language in the fair use provision stating that a use
is “not an infringement” aligns beautifully with language in the dilution statute
providing that “the following [uses] shall not be actionable.” See 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).
I acknowledge that in the case of copyright fair use, Congress was codifying the
judicial doctrine of fair use, which had long been treated procedurally as a defense—
namely, it was potentially applicable regardless of the plaintiff’s ability to prove a prima
facie case of infringement, and the defendant bore the burden of proof. As a result, when
Congress did not expressly reallocate the burden of proof away from the defendant or
otherwise indicate a departure from the historical treatment of fair use, the Court easily
characterized fair use as an affirmative defense. In contrast, dilution liability as a basis for
a trademark claim does not reflect codification of judicial doctrine, nor does a
noncommercial use defense from any form of trademark liability. As a result, courts do not
have a historical context from which to operate in determining the appropriate procedural
treatment for a defendant’s assertion of excusable “noncommercial use.” Still, based on the
overall statutory structure and the logical allocation of the burden of proof, noncommercial
use is an affirmative defense and should be treated as such.
208. The court in World Championship Wrestling v. Titan Sports, Inc. faced a motion to
dismiss based on the noncommercial use exclusion. 46 F. Supp. 2d 118, 122-23 (D. Conn.
1999). Referring to the legislative history of the exclusion as well as Bolger and Dr. Seuss,
the court interpreted the noncommercial use exclusion as removing uses not constituting
“commercial speech” from the scope of dilution liability, even if the use increased sales. Id.
And yet the court implied that in cases where a defendant makes an expressive use, a
balancing analysis of the sort done in Rogers v. Grimaldi is most appropriate, rather than
placing that use squarely within the noncommercial use exclusion. Id. at 123. On the other
hand, the court also briefly addressed the issue of mixed speech, speech “[b]etween
advertisement and art,” so perhaps it meant to apply the balancing analysis only to the
analysis of mixed speech rather than purely expressive uses. Id. But even that
interpretation contradicts, in my view, the proper statutory construction. In any event,
because the court found no prior cases to present clear guidance on how to characterize
professional wrestling within speech jurisprudence, it declined to decide the matter on a
motion to dismiss:
The world of professional wrestling seems to be a hybrid of expressive
performance and advertisement, with wrestlers trading insults, performing
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proaches fully captures the value of the exclusion. Treating the exclusion as an affirmative defense provides predictability and efficiency to cases involving a noncommercial use.
If noncommercial use is treated as an element of the prima facie
case, the plaintiff will bear the burden of proving a host of issues unlikely to be relevant in garden-variety dilution cases. A range of factual and legal issues are raised by this exclusion as well as the other
statutory exclusions.209 If a defendant does not raise these issues in
its defense, the plaintiff should not be obligated to address them. And
treating the exclusions as affirmative defenses comports better with
the overall thrust of the dilution statute—to strengthen protection for
famous trademarks—because it places the burden of proof on the defendant who wishes to use the famous mark without liability. Affirmative defense status does mean that the noncommercial use exclusion would apply even if a claim for dilution could otherwise be made
out—even if the defendant’s use did diminish the distinctiveness of
the plaintiff’s famous mark. No balance between the defendant’s interest and the plaintiff’s interest would take place.210 I find this to be
an entirely appropriate result.
Affirmative defense status is a must.211 First, the burden of pleading and proving that a use is noncommercial, and that the use should
therefore be excluded from liability under section 43(c), appropriately
lies with the defendant.212 Importing proof of commercial use as an
additional element of a plaintiff’s case in all dilution disputes is impractical and does not comport with the generally trademarkprotective nature of the statute. In light of the appropriate allocation
of burdens of pleading and of proof, the exclusions from dilution lia-

attention-getting stunts and challenging each other to fights in the hopes of
attracting viewers. The balancing test called for in the case law involves factual
and legal issues which cannot be disposed of at this stage in the case.
Id.
209. See 15 U.S.C..§ 1125(c)(3); see also supra text accompanying note 72.
210. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
211. The end result should be the same, of course, meaning there is no liability on the
part of the defendant for the disputed activity, no injunction or damages; but the procedure
is different (and procedure, in turn, can affect outcomes in some cases, particularly when
the evidence is found to be in equipoise). The burden of proof changes depending on
the operation of the provision, and the common perception of the equities might change
as well.
212. But see Ramsey, supra note 82, at 421 (arguing, in the context of a defendant’s
First Amendment challenge to a trademark infringement action, that the burden of proof
on the commercial nature of speech should remain with the trademark holder and that the
First Amendment is not, in those contexts, an “affirmative defense”). MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS, a commonly consulted treatise, does not specifically address the burden of
proof in the context of dilution in detail, but it does characterize the noncommercial use
exclusion as a “statutory defense.” J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION 24:123-128 (4th ed. 2009).
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bility must be treated as affirmative defenses rather than in a procedurally amorphous manner.213
2. The Breadth of “Use in Commerce”
When does the noncommercial use exclusion find practical vitality
as an affirmative defense? In other words, when is a use in commerce
a noncommercial use? The primary liability provision limits actionable dilution to “use of a mark or trade name in commerce,” and a
question has been raised as to whether noncommercial speech can be
caught in the liability net in the first instance.214 I argue that it is entirely possible, and even probable, that noncommercial speech can
survive the limitation to “use of a mark or trade name in commerce.”
In examining whether “use of a mark or trade name in commerce”
and “noncommercial use of a mark” are mutually exclusive concepts,
the “trademark use” debate enters into the discussion.215
The current federal dilution statute requires a “use of a mark or
trade name in commerce” by a defendant before dilution liability may
attach.216 Without taking sides in the recent vigorous “trademark
use” debate,217 for purposes of this Article it suffices to note that interpretations of “use in commerce” of a mark within that debate vary,

213. Affirmative defense status also means that even at the preliminary injunction
stage, the defendant will bear the burden of proof on the noncommercial use issue. See
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 419 (2006)
(stating clearly that “the burdens . . . at the preliminary injunction stage track the burdens
at trial”); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (same).
214. See id. at 554 n.64 (calling the noncommercial use exclusion surplus language,
“mere belt and suspenders” supporting their interpretation of a narrow prima facie case).
“It is also worth noting that [15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)] is styled as ‘exclusions’ from the scope
of the act, not as defenses to an otherwise viable cause of action, further undermining the
idea that the presence of a ‘designation of source’ or ‘noncommercial use’ limitation in that
section implies that the general bill reaches further than that.” Id.
215. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 65, at 549-54 (arguing that the “use of a mark”
language in the liability provision greatly narrows the scope of the dilution statute because
they believe it requires, essentially, “use as a mark,” or “trademark use”).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
217. See, e.g., Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion Over Use, supra note 45 (discussing the
debate over trademark use and rejecting trademark use theory); Dinwoodie & Janis,
Lessons, supra note 45; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law
Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1674 (2007) (suggesting a framework for
the trademark use requirement which “serves as a limited tool for identifying classes of
behavior that cannot constitute infringement”); McKenna, supra note 45, at 773
(attempting to “mediate[] a scholarly debate regarding the existence and desirability of a
‘trademark use’ doctrine”); see also Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the
Demise of “Trademark Use,” 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371 (2006) (discussing the history and
purpose of the trademark use requirement and proposing a modern definition); Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Dilution’s (Still) Uncertain Future, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 98, 100-01 (2006) available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/
fi/105/dinwoodie.pdf; Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law,
54 EMORY L.J. 507, 511 (2005) (arguing that “courts should consider the [internet] search
process stage where searchers see a trademark being used”).
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but they all continue to potentially include noncommercial uses, at
least insofar as “noncommercial use” is properly interpreted as set
forth in this Article. For example, one interpretation of “trademark
use,” or use in commerce of a mark, proposed in the scholarship
comes from Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, two major participants
in the use debate.218 They explain “trademark use” for purposes of a
defendant’s infringement liability as primarily “branding” use, expanding on that concept in these terms: a defendant’s use of a mark
“in the process of selling, marketing, or advertising [its] own products,”219 and “using the mark to promote its own products or services
[and also] using it ‘as a mark’ – i.e. to indicate the source or sponsorship of those products or services.”220 Other meanings of “use in commerce” exist in the cases and literature.221 Certain of those meanings
may (or may not) supply content to infringement and dilution claims,
and I do not here endorse any of the various proposed interpretations
of the concept of “trademark use.” But I do argue that any of those interpretations could easily include uses of marks in noncommercial
speech.222

218. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 217, at 1673-88.
219. Id. at 1677.
220. Id. at 1682.
221. See sources cited supra note 217.
222. The Lanham Act contains, at section 45, a definition of the “use in commerce” of a
mark that is required for the creation of federally registrable trademark rights. First,
“commerce” is defined as “all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress,” and
then “use in commerce” is defined as
the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made
merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall
be deemed to be in use in commerce—
(1) on goods when—
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays
associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of
the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated
with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services
and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in
more than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the
person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with
the services.
15 U.S.C. § 1127. It seems fairly obvious to me that Lanham Act “use in commerce” can
cover noncommercial speech. Words on a t-shirt or bumper sticker certainly would “use
[the words] in commerce” on goods (the t-shirts or bumper stickers) under the definition,
since those words would be “placed in any manner” on the goods, and those goods (at least
in almost all conceivable cases) would be “transported in commerce” within the broad, fullest-extent-of-the-Commerce-Clause definition of “commerce” contained in the Lanham Act.
Dogan and Lemley did not advocate limiting infringing trademark use to the “use in
commerce” required for creation of rights and conceded that asymmetry will exist between
the more restrictive “trademark use” sufficient to create trademark rights and a somewhat
broader understanding of “trademark use” sufficient to create potential infringement liabil-
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Analyzing, for example, the “branding” interpretation—or a defendant’s use of a mark “in the process of selling, marketing, or advertising [its] own products”—demonstrates that more than commercial speech can be ensnared within the basic liability provision. Consider a t-shirt or a bumper sticker bearing specific words. The t-shirt
or bumper sticker is sold, and in the process of selling it, the seller
even emphasizes the words displayed on the product. Such an example would be indistinguishable, I argue, from the “branding” conception of trademark use,223 but plenty of t-shirts and bumper stickers on
which words are placed certainly do not constitute commercial
speech. Shirts and bumper stickers distributed by political campaigns immediately come to mind,224 as do those items bearing religious slogans or even humorous (or not) commentary or platitudes.
The same is true of book and magazine covers,225 and numerous other
ity. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 217, at 1675-76. Still, according to them, “[a] reasonable
reading of the [section 45] ‘use in commerce’ definition in the infringement context would
limit infringement to the general sorts of uses listed in the definition—i.e., uses that employ the trademark as a brand.” Id. at 1676.
223. The use would be indistinguishable from a “branding” use at least up to the point
that a court made a fact-specific inquiry into the effect of the use on consumers—whether
consumers regarded the use as an indication of source. See infra note 230 and
accompanying text.
224. One example comes from the 2007 gubernatorial election in Louisiana. The Bobby
Jindal campaign distributed, for a time, bumper stickers proclaiming “Tigers for Jindal” in
a purple-and-gold color scheme and “Saints for Jindal” in a black-and-gold color scheme
(among others). The Louisiana State University mascot is the tiger, and the university’s
colors are purple and gold, while the New Orleans Saints professional football team uses a
black-and-gold color combination. Recently, before that election, Louisiana State
University had not been reticent about enforcing its claimed trademark rights in the school
colors. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Smack Apparel Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 653, 656-61 (E.D. La.
2006) (accepting the plaintiff Universities’ definition of their trademarks as “color schemes
in the context of merchandise that makes reference to the [p]laintiff Universities or their
accomplishments and is directed to their fans and other interested consumers,” and finding
that plaintiffs had established secondary meaning for their claimed marks as well as a
likelihood of confusion arising from defendant’s t-shirts), aff’d, 550 F.3d 465, 475-85 (5th
Cir. 2008). Local publications reported that the campaign agreed not to print any
additional stickers after the University and the team complained. According to one article,
a University spokesman stated that officials were more concerned about a perception that
a public university had taken sides in the race than they were about trademark
infringement. See Jan Moller, Jindal Backpedaling on Bumper Stickers: LSU, Tulane,
Saints Warn: Hands Off, TIMES-PICAYUNE, August 9, 2007, at 2 (available at
http://www.nola.com/timespic/stories/index.ssf?/base/news-5/1186642607113410.xml&coll=1).
Nevertheless, one might have understood if the state university had declined to take any
enforcement measures against the campaign of the leading gubernatorial candidate, who
might soon (and now does) lead the state, including wielding significant influence within
its university systems. (For the record, while I am employed by the Louisiana State
University system, I have no knowledge regarding any communication between the
University and the campaign.)
225. Fox News sued Al Franken and the publisher of his book, LIES AND THE LYING
LIARS WHO TELL THEM: A FAIR AND BALANCED LOOK AT THE RIGHT, for trademark
infringement and trademark dilution (including a New York state law dilution claim) of its
FAIR AND BALANCED mark, although Fox voluntarily dismissed the action after being
denied a preliminary injunction. See Fox News Network, LLC v. Penguin Group (USA),
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communicative goods on which words are placed in a dominant or
other eye-catching manner.226 It bears emphasis that a wide variety
of goods raise this issue, not just traditional communicative goods. In
addition to the t-shirts and bumper stickers discussed above, consider the significant communicative function of coffee mugs, hats, articles of clothing, and other consumer goods in today’s culture.
The above discussion assumes that little practical meaning can be
derived from the different uses of the terms “a mark” and “the famous mark” in dilution’s prima facie case, which requires “use of a
mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution . . . of
the famous mark.” 227 But as I propose more generally above with respect to the overall “trademark use” debate in the dilution context, I
do not think that any description of a “mark” that we now have and
use explains the concept without referring back to the consumer effect of the use, namely whether the word, design, or other device is
used in such a way as to designate source in the mind of a significant
proportion of consumers. As other scholars have set forth in greater
detail, trademark use is not an efficient gatekeeper in many (if any)
cases because it relies on consumer conceptions about what devices
used in connection with goods and services indicate the source, which
leads back into likelihood of confusion. 228 In dilution, where likelihood of confusion is not an issue, source-designation status, or trademark use, becomes exceedingly difficult to establish in borderline
cases. Certain uses have become widely accepted as sourceidentifying uses, such as the placement of words or designs on hang
tags attached to goods.229 But other uses of words or designs, such as
the t-shirts, coffee mugs, and bumper stickers mentioned above, may
be ornamental at times, may be source-identifying at times, and may
be communicative at times. Without examining the particular use for
its consumer effect, one cannot know. Trademark use, even if it were
accepted as a requirement for the prima facie case, thus seems unInc., 03-CV-6162, 2003 WL 23281520 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Susan Saulny, In Courtroom,
Laughter at Fox and a Victory for Al Franken, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2003 at B1. Judge
Denny Chin did not rely on the noncommercial use exclusion contained within the federal
dilution statute in denying the preliminary injunction (note that the New York statute
does not contain such a statutory exclusion or defense), but he did reference the First
Amendment. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Fox News
Network, No. 03-CV-6162, 2003 WL 23281520.
226. For example, the music CDs in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894,
903 (9th Cir. 2002), discussed further in Part IV.A. of this Article, might easily fall within
this type of “trademark use,” since they bore the words “Barbie Girl” in a prominent
manner on the cover.
227. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 65, at 549-54 (emphasis added).
228. See Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion over Use, supra note 45, at 1641-42; Dinwoodie
& Janis, Lessons, supra note 45, at 1713-14; McKenna, supra note 45, at 797-98.
229. See, e.g., TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 904.03 (5th ed., 2007)
(stating that labels, tags, and containers for goods are all appropriate specimens of use
proving use of the mark in commerce in connection with a trademark application).
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likely to efficiently, effectively, and reliably control the scope of dilution liability. Moreover, the noncommercial use exclusion itself refers
to use of “a mark.” Asking a judge to use the concept of “a mark” to
make close distinctions between uses falling in the prima facie case
and those falling in the exclusion, when “a mark” appears in each,
seems to me a request unlikely to meet with much success.
But even if trademark uses were efficiently and reliably identifiable, there would still be practical vitality in the noncommercial use
exclusion as a backstop for protecting speech. The fact is that dilution
claims have been, and will likely continue to be based upon uses of
trademarks in noncommercial speech.230 Mattel v. MCA231 (the “Barbie Girl” case) provides further support for this contention. Comparing two cases based on t-shirts demonstrates the vitality of the exclusion in protecting valuable First Amendment freedoms, even when
the freedom is being exercised via a mixture of commercial and noncommercial motives.232 Without a noncommercial use exclusion applicable to the relevant state or federal infringement claims, one court
examining a modified trademark used by a third party on a t-shirt
found infringement liability, even in the face of a First Amendment
defense and rather weak survey evidence of confusion.233 But with the
noncommercial use exclusion in the federal dilution statute, another
court protected a very similar use of a modified trademark on a tshirt by applying the exclusion as a defense.234 In each case, the de230. See, e.g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2008)
(holding that Smith’s modified Wal-Mart logo designs constituted noncommercial speech
excluded from dilution liability “despite the fact that Smith sold the designs to the public
on t-shirts and other novelty merchandise”); American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line
Productions, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998) (entering preliminary injunction
barring New Line’s use of “Dairy Queens” as the title of a movie about small town beauty
pageants in Minnesota’s dairy country after finding that the title was used to market and
identify the film and after rejecting a claim that the film title constituted a noncommercial
use); see also Emerson Electric Co. v. NBC Universal Television Studios Inc., No. 4:06-cv01454-ERW (E.D. Mo. filed Oct. 2, 2006) (claiming dilution of Emerson’s IN SINK
ERATOR trademark based on the incidental appearance of an IN SINK ERATOR-branded
food waste disposer in a television show, when a character damaged her hand by inserting
it into the disposer).
231. 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003).
232. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987); Smith v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
233. See Novak, 836 F.2d at 400-03 (finding infringement liability appropriate for
“Mutant of Omaha” t-shirts sold for the purpose of bringing attention to the perils of
nuclear war, when only about 10% of surveyed consumers evidenced confusion about
Mutual of Omaha’s affiliation with the t-shirts following a leading question on the issue).
Although the plaintiff had raised a state dilution claim, the appellate court did not reach
the it on appeal because no additional remedy would be available beyond that already
awarded for infringement. Id. at 398 n.2.
234. See Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1340 (applying the noncommercial use exclusion to
find federal dilution liability inappropriate for “Walocaust” t-shirts, which were sold for the
purpose of bringing attention to the corporate policies of the Wal-Mart retail chain of
stores). Of interest, although perhaps not of legal significance, is that the decision ruling
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fendant sold items bearing the modified mark but argued that the
use of the modified mark on the shirts (or other items) was for purposes of advocacy.235 This overlap between activities potentially creating trademark liability and activities constituting fully protected
speech highlights the vitality of the noncommercial speech exclusion.
3. Comparing Noncommercial Use to a Constitutional Defense
At least one commentator has suggested that the potential availability of a direct constitutional defense in any event makes the noncommercial use exclusion unnecessary.236 I disagree. The existence of
the noncommercial use exclusion shows that Congress balanced the
interests and determined that noncommercial speech interests are of
higher value than the low risk they pose to the “property”-type right
created by the dilution statute. This Congressional balancing is superior to, and operates differently from, the case-by-case balancing that
would occur if a defendant were required to raise a direct First
Amendment defense for an expressive use.237
A statutory affirmative defense for noncommercial use is much
more predictable and efficient than constitutional review of an individual application of dilution liability to a claimed expressive use. Efficiency arises during litigation because the ultimate issue of dilution
does not matter—the defense applies regardless of the diluting nature of the use. If the defendant can prove that the exclusion applies
at the motion to dismiss phase, there will be no need to spend resources deciding the case in chief, including the resources required to
conduct expensive surveys and experts.
Also, the noncommercial use exclusion allows a court to resolve
the speech issue without requiring it to rule on a constitutional question, something courts prefer to do only as a last resort.238 Without an
for Smith on infringement (which does not have a noncommercial use exclusion) covers
twenty-three pages as published, while the decision on dilution (applying the exclusion)
occupies less than one page.
235. See Novak, 836 F.2d at 402; Smith, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
236. Gulasekaram, supra note 173, at 898 (stating that, with respect to dilution claims
against expressive use, “the First Amendment would control, creating a fundamental norm
that cannot be abridged by federal or state statute or lack thereof. In this sense, the
FTDA’s statutory exemption, while helpful and clear, is superfluous: it protects what is
already protected.”). I agree that the First Amendment controls, but because of the
comparative simplicity of the noncommercial use exclusion versus a constitutional defense,
as set forth further above, I do not agree that the exclusion is “superfluous.”
237. See supra note 172 (discussing and quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974)).
238. See, e.g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) (“Where
a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal
Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed from without important
reasons.”). Siler, while not always followed, has been cited with approval numerous times,
including in Justice Brandeis’s oft-cited unofficial rules of decision of the Court, from his
concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority. 297 U.S. 288, 346-48
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affirmative defense, a First Amendment defense would typically only
be considered after the prima facie case had been decided in the
plaintiff’s favor.239 Predictability arises from the ability of a defendant to obtain a speech-protective ruling by applying only a limited
concept from the commercial speech doctrine without opening the balancing analysis of a constitutional question.
Another benefit, perhaps more important, is that even if a court
were willing to delve into the constitutional issue,240 the availability
of a statutory defense avoids the imagined difficulty of balancing a
private “property” right against a speech interest in any particular
case.241 The balancing of “property” with speech can lead to reliance
on the “alternative avenues” theory for subordinating a speech inter-

(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (setting forth “a series of rules under which [the Court]
has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for
decision,” and citing Siler for the fourth rule: “The Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present
some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”).
239. But see L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987)
(reversing summary judgment for the plaintiff, L.L. Bean, on First Amendment grounds,
over a dissent which argued that it was “premature to pass on the constitutionality of the
Maine trademark dilution statute without a determination whether, under Maine law, a
pornographic parody of this kind would violate that statute”) (Campbell, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
240. Not all courts avoid direct constitutional rulings, even when the exclusion allows a
court to do so, as demonstrated by Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d
1002 (9th Cir. 2004). The district court had prohibited Nissan Computer from placing links
on www.nissan.com or www.nissan.net to other websites with negative commentary about
Nissan Motor. Id. at 1006-07. The district court had based this portion of its ruling on the
need to prevent dilution in the future. Id. at 1008-09. The Ninth Circuit stated that “[t]he
FTDA anticipates the constitutional problem where the speech is not commercial but is
potentially dilutive by including an exception for noncommercial use of a mark. So, the
relevant question is whether linking to sites that contain disparaging comments about
Nissan Motor on the nissan.com website is commercial.”Id. at 1016-17 (citations omitted).
Yet the Nissan court, after having introduced its inquiry into the divide between a
commercial and a noncommercial use by placing it within the dilution statute’s exclusion,
ruled by referring to the First Amendment, rather than simply to the exclusion. “[W]e
conclude that the permanent injunction violates the First Amendment to the extent that it
enjoins the placing of links on nissan.com to sites with disparaging comments about
Nissan Motor.” Id. at 1018. The court’s direct resort to the First Amendment for its ruling
is puzzling in light of the option of simply relying on statutory language and legislative
history. It could have rested its ruling on the fact that the district court’s injunction
extended beyond the reach of the statute it ostensibly enforced. Still, the case provides
additional insight into the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the noncommercial use
exclusion in the dilution statute. And it also indicates, perhaps, that the Ninth Circuit
would be willing to apply the same reasoning to an injunction issued under a state dilution
law without a specific exclusion—news that is heartening indeed to those who are
concerned about the breadth of state laws.
241. See, e.g., Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 954 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (“Trademark rights need not ‘yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under
circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.’ “) (quoting
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.
1979)); Reddy Commc’ns, Inc. v. Envtl. Action Found., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 630, 633-34
(D.D.C. 1977). See also Denicola, supra note 84 (criticizing this line of thinking).
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est. Although this theory has been largely discredited within trademark scholarship and case law,242 it continues to surface.243 There is
value in avoiding further propagation of that theory. Using the noncommercial use exclusion as an affirmative defense effectuates the
property-speech balance that Congress already struck in favor of
noncommercial speech.
Two cases in which defendants successfully used the noncommercial use exclusion help illustrate the advantage of the exclusion as
compared to a direct constitutional defense. The American Family
Life Assurance Co. (AFLAC) attempted to stop Timothy Hagan, an
Ohio gubernatorial candidate, from using a quacking duck reminiscent of AFLAC’s own quacking duck in his advertising.244 Hagan had
mimicked the AFLAC duck when creating his “TaftQuack” duck as
part of his criticism of the incumbent, Robert Taft.245 In denying a
preliminary injunction to AFLAC on its various claims, including
trademark infringement and dilution, the court first found no likelihood of success on the infringement claim because the court found little similarity in appearance between the two ducks and no competitive proximity of goods or services.246 The court’s decision on the dilution claim centered on both the noncommercial use exclusion and
First Amendment protection.247 Following a survey of several cases,
including Mattel v. MCA and prominent domain-name-related dilution cases,248 as well as a portion of the legislative history of the noncommercial use exclusion, the court concluded that regardless of the
breadth of the exclusion (with Mattel representing the broadest position), the speech in the instant case should be protected under the
exclusion because it was political speech, which is at the core of First
Amendment protection.249 The court was careful to note that Hagan
did not use the AFLAC duck as a source identifier, and that he used
his TaftQuack duck as part of a communicative message accusing incumbent Taft of “ducking” issues and being a “quack.”250 As such, the
court found Hagan’s use of the duck to be a noncommercial use exempted from liability under the statutory exclusion.251

242. See supra note 85.
243. See, e.g., Kraft Foods, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 954.
244. Am. Family Life Ins. [sic] Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 685 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 691-92.
247. Id. at 695-701.
248. Id. The court referenced, in particular, Planned Parenthood Federation of America
Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) and Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky,
993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998). For more on these cases, see supra note 7.
249. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 698.
250. Id. at 700.
251. Id. at 701.
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As part of its First Amendment discussion, the Hagan court rejected AFLAC’s argument that because there were “alternative avenues” available to Hagan to express his criticisms of Taft, the trademark claim should be superior to the First Amendment defense.252 In
so doing, the court sided with decisions like L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake
Publishers, Inc.,253 which flatly rejected the argument that trademark
property rights need not yield to speech interests, and with commentators like Denicola254 who argue that speech issues cannot be decided on the basis of comparing real property rights to trademark
rights.255 The court even cited the dissent from Mutual of Omaha calling the “alternative avenues” approach “ ‘inappropriate . . . [because]
the property involved is not real estate but a trademark—a form of
intangible property that itself conveys or symbolizes ideas.’ “256
The court agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s Mattel decision to read
the noncommercial use exclusion broadly, such that the exclusion encompasses not only speech that is entirely noncommercial, but also
speech mixing commercial and noncommercial elements.257 It argued
that Congress intended to exclude from liability “any speech that
does not solely and entirely constitute ‘commercial speech,’ within the
meaning of the First Amendment.”258 The court noted that Congress
did not intend to incorporate all First Amendment case law through
the noncommercial use exclusion (such as, perhaps, a need to balance
the specific speech interest with the trademark interest in each noncommercial use case).259 The court applied the exclusion as an affirmative defense rather than as a gateway to full First Amendment review of the application of the statute to Hagan’s use.260 In support of
252. Id. at 697-98.
253. 811 F.2d 26, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1987).
254. Denicola, supra note 84.
255. See Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 697 (citing L.L. Bean, which in turn cites Denicola).
256. Id. at 698 (quoting Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 405 (8th
Cir. 1987) (Heaney, J., dissenting)).
257. Id. at 696.
258. Id.
259. Id. For an example of a case engaging in case-specific balancing of speech and
trademark interests, see Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group,
Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding in an infringement analysis that “the degree
of risk of confusion between Spy Notes [defendant’s product] and Cliffs Notes [plaintiff’s
product] does not outweigh the well-established public interest in parody”). For an example
of a dilution case where the court appeared to think that a finding of noncommercial use
would lead to the balancing of speech and trademark interests, see World Championship
Wrestling v. Titan Sports, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 118 (D. Conn. 1999) (addressing a motion to
dismiss based on the noncommercial use exclusion and declining to perform a balancing of
the factual and legal issues at that procedural stage). The World Championship Wrestling
decision is discussed further in note 208, supra. For a discussion and criticism of Cliffs
Notes, see McGeveran, supra note 205, at 101-03.
260. Despite its extensive discussion and application of the noncommercial use defense
to the federal dilution claim, the court did, in ruling on the state dilution claim, state that
“[t]he First Amendment protects Hagan from AFLAC’s dilution claim under the Lanham
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that construction, the court noted that if Congress simply wished to
import First Amendment protection into the statute, it would not
have needed to draft an express exclusion at all, since the dilution
statute could not override the First Amendment in any event.261 The
Hagan court also decided that the First Amendment protected Hagan
from a state dilution claim.262 The reasoning it developed under the
federal exclusion guided its balancing of the state dilution claim
against the use in question.263
Another district court decision on a state dilution claim serves as
a cautionary note to those who would read over the exclusion and
leave defendants to rely on a direct First Amendment defense.264 That
court heard the dispute between Ralph Nader and Mastercard that
arose out of one of Nader’s campaign commercials.265
Ralph Nader’s 2000 presidential campaign created and aired a television advertisement (also available on Nader’s website) that declared
“finding out the truth” to be “priceless,” and also used the phrase
“There are some things that money can’t buy.”266 Soon thereafter, Mastercard sued for infringement and dilution of its federally registered
trademarks, PRICELESS and THERE ARE SOME THINGS MONEY
CAN’T BUY. FOR EVERYTHING ELSE THERE’S MASTERCARD.267
After the court denied Mastercard’s motion for a preliminary injunction during the campaign, Nader’s campaign filed for summary judgment on all counts (which also included copyright infringement and
state law claims for infringement and dilution).268 The court addressed
the infringement claim by balancing the traditional likelihood of confusion factors and found no genuine issue of material fact related to a
likelihood of confusion that would constitute infringement.269
After surveying the elements of a prima facie case for dilution, the
court noted that the FTDA “specifically exempts noncommercial uses of
a mark from its coverage,” and it referenced the statutory exclusion.270
Act. And, of course, the First Amendment provides this protection from AFLAC’s dilution
claim under state law, as well.” Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 701.
261. Id. at 696.
262. Id. at 701. The state dilution statute did not contain statutory exclusions.
263. See supra note 260.
264. See Mastercard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046,
2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
265. Id. at *1.
266. Id.
267. Id. at *2. The full Nader ad included a sequential display of a series of items
showing the price of each (“grilled tenderloin for fundraiser; [sic] $1,000 a plate;”
“campaign ads filled with half-truths: $10 million;” “promises to special interest groups:
over $100 billion”). The advertisement ends with a phrase identifying a priceless intangible
that cannot be purchased (“finding out the truth: priceless. There are some things that
money can’t buy”). Id. at *1.
268. Id.
269. Id. at *2-4.
270. Id. at *6-7.
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The court then, oddly enough, analyzed the meaning of “commercial” by
considering the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “commercial” as
well as the Lanham Act’s definition of “use in commerce.”271 Mastercard
had argued that the commercial nature of the ad was demonstrated by
the fact that contributions to Nader’s campaign increased after the ad
ran.272 The court first rejected that argument by stating that “[e]ven assuming the Nader Ad caused greater contributions to be made to his
political campaign, this would not be enough to deem Ralph Nader’s Ad
‘commercial.’ If so, then presumably, as suggested by defendants, all political campaign speech would also be ‘commercial speech’ since all political candidates collect contributions.”273
The court never mentioned the legislative history of the FTDA. Instead, it referenced all the way back to comments made in Congress in
1989 related to the false advertising provision of section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.274 These comments reaffirmed that the false advertising
provision would not apply to political advertising.275 The court also referred to the Hagan court’s determination that political advertising,
even advertising linked to campaign contributions, is noncommercial
speech exempt from dilution liability under the FTDA.276 But it did not
expressly acknowledge the earlier decision’s use of legislative history
and First Amendment jurisprudence in reaching that conclusion.277 After finding the Nader ad to be exempt from the FTDA as political rather than commercial use, the court went on to find that even if the
use were commercial, there was no evidence to indicate that Nader’s
use of Mastercard’s marks had diluted their distinctiveness.278
Of particular interest in light of the distinctions between federal
dilution claims and state dilution claims is the fact that the court’s
ruling for Nader on the New York state dilution claim relied solely on
the finding that Mastercard had presented no evidence of likelihood
of dilution: “There is no evidence that defendants’ limited and political use of plaintiff’s marks could weaken those marks’ ability to serve
271. Id. at *7.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at *7-8.
275. Id.
276. Id. at *8.
277. Id. For another political speech analysis in the dilution context, see Griffith v.
Fenrick, 486 F. Supp. 2d 848, 853 (W.D. Wis. 2007). In Griffith, the court found that the
defendant’s use of a shortened form, Andy Griffith, of his new legal name, Andrew Griffith,
in running for sheriff of his town, was protected by the noncommercial use exclusion
because it was not purely commercial speech. Id. There was no real question of mixed
commercial-noncommercial speech because the use of the name was to seek elected office, a
use that was entirely noncommercial because “it did not propose any commercial
transactions,” and the seeking of contributions to his campaign was ancillary to the
political speech and therefore protected as such. Id at 853.
278. Nader, 2004 WL 434404 at *9.
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as a unique identifier of plaintiff’s goods or services.”279 Unlike the
Hagan decision, the Nader decision did not import any of the noncommercial use analysis into its ruling on the state dilution claim.
It is understandable that the Nader court did not resort to constitutional analysis of a First Amendment issue when it thought it had
another avenue that reached the same result. But in light of the chilling effect of a lack of predictability and efficiency within a legal regime restricting speech, it is striking to note that Nader’s campaign
was subject to the vagaries of a dilution determination on the merits
rather than having a clear expressive defense to the New York statute, even after the noncommercial use exclusion had been applied to
the federal claim. This risk of liability under state law, even for core
political speech, shows the importance of the statutory exclusion in
the federal statute.
The speech concerns raised by the federal law (and state laws
modeled thereon) are certainly more limited than they would be
without the statutory exclusion, at least assuming the courts apply it
as broadly as written. But state laws without statutory defenses or
exclusions retain the direct clash with both commercial and noncommercial speech that Congress attempted to avoid in the federal
law. Courts applying the federal dilution statute should apply the
noncommercial use exclusion broadly, as argued here. Courts applying state laws without a statutory exclusion should consider the approach of the Hagan decision, where the federal noncommercial use
exclusion can serve as a guide for analyzing a First Amendment defense to state dilution liability.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article began with a curious question: When is a use in commerce a noncommercial use? Using First Amendment jurisprudence
on mixed speech, in connection with the legislative history and statutory language of the federal dilution law, we can discern the answer.
A use in commerce is a noncommercial use when the use of a mark
either intertwines commercial and noncommercial speech elements
or is not an integral part of a commercial transaction, i.e., when the
use is not purely commercial speech. The noncommercial use exception to federal dilution liability exists to give noncommercial speakers, even those with mixed motives, a simple, relatively painless defense that allows the judiciary and parties to end those cases early.280
279. Id.
280. See McGeveran, supra note 205 at 105-06 (explaining relative paucity of cases
decided under the news reporting exclusion by noting that the clarity of that exclusion may
prevent claims from being brought in the first instance, and contrasting that clarity with
the current status of the noncommercial use exclusion). It is true that defendants who are
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Congress created a narrower dilution cause of action than was provided by the state laws that existed at the time it enacted the FTDA in
1995. For example, compared to state laws, Congress narrowed the action from applying to distinctive marks to applying only to famous
marks. In 2006, Congress further narrowed the scope of dilution to
eliminate protection for marks with only niche fame. With respect to
exclusions, Congress evinced a desire to ensure the continued viability
of, among other uses, comparative advertising utilizing famous marks.
Congress also appears to have wanted to exempt from dilution liability
a different and far broader group of uses—fully protected speech. This
desire culminated in the noncommercial use exclusion.281
Application of the noncommercial use exclusion to the federal dilution statute has been sporadic. Some courts appear to shy away from
using it—perhaps because they are concerned that applying the exclusion involves a full First Amendment balancing assessment. The
fact is, it does not. It is simply a categorical, statutory affirmative defense, albeit one that relies on First Amendment case law to define a
crucial term. In addition, it is an exclusion that, like the fair use defense to use of an incontestable mark in section 33, applies even if
the dilution plaintiff can prove its prima facie case. Courts ought to
rely on the exclusion more—and they may find their analyses less
tortured as a result. It is true that courts may find a large number of
uses exempt from liability if the exclusion is applied to its fullest extent, as it was in Mattel v. MCA Records, but (1) that is the most
straightforward interpretation of the statutory language, and (2) that
result appears to be exactly what Congress intended.
A key issue for future legislative focus is to encourage states to include a noncommercial speech exception in their laws. Even if the
“trademark use” proponents win the day with respect to the federal
dilution action, that interpretation would have little persuasive effect
on state dilution statutes, particularly those not amended following
the 2006 change in federal law. With respect to dilution, the “trademark use” argument is based in significant part on the TDRA’s statusuccessful under the noncommercial use defense will generally still bear their own
attorneys’ fees, which are not a trivial expense. Nevertheless, adding clarity should begin
to create strong precedents which will in turn discourage suits against noncommercial uses
in the future. If the case law broadly applying the exclusion were to become sufficiently
clear and robust, courts could even begin to award attorney’s fees to defendants if dilution
claims were to be made against defendants engaged in uses falling well within the
boundaries of the noncommercial use exclusion.
281. See WELKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 327-28 (arguing for a broad noncommercial use
exclusion in 43(c), despite the expansive interpretation of “commercial” activities in other
sections of the Lanham Act, because dilution law was intended to be less encompassing
than other provisions, and because “the legislative history of the FTDA, going back to
1988, demonstrates a serious congressional concern that dilution would be used to stifle
legitimate expression. The point of Section 43(c)(4)(B) [now 43(c)(3)(C)] is to respond to
those concerns by excluding various forms of speech from liability.”).
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tory language and legislative history. If the federal law becomes subject to the more restrictive interpretation, trademark owners wishing
to push the envelope on dilution will simply turn to state laws instead.282 Adding a noncommercial use exclusion to state laws would
allow courts to more effectively and efficiently analyze free-speechbased defenses to state-law claims. Perhaps more to the point for
most state legislators, the addition would make a state dilution statute less susceptible to First Amendment invalidation.
Courts should not shy away from applying the noncommercial use
exclusion as broadly as First Amendment jurisprudence teaches that
they should, thus including mixed speech. Courts should allow defendants to use the exclusion as an affirmative defense, one that can
be ruled on through a motion to dismiss or summary judgment even
when a prima facie case for dilution has been, or could conceivably
be, proven.
Dilution protection is an extreme measure, and its standard remedy of a permanent injunction is strong medicine. Only commercial
speech should be subjected to the dilution statute; that is the best
interpretation of the exclusion in the full statutory and jurisprudential context. The legislative history is clear that such a meaning
was Congress’s intent, and it makes dilution liability more predictable (and the defense more efficient) and thus less likely to chill
expressive uses.

282. See Welkowitz, supra note 17, at 704-05.

